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WHY IS FAME STILL CONFUSING? MISUSE OF THE
"NICHE MARKET THEORY" UNDER THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
INTRODUCTION
People who own famous trademarks do not take kindly to having
their mark used to promote and sell goods other than their own. They
have spent time, effort, and marketing resources to develop their
trademark. Thus, fairness concerns seem to dictate that they should
reap the benefit of any goodwill and resulting profits generated by the
mark. For example, Anheuser-Busch, an advertising giant, has culti-
vated and used its BUDWEISER trademark to identify and distin-
guish its products in excess of one hundred years.1 Due to the
enormous amounts of money, time, and effort employed to publicize
its slogan THIS BUD'S FOR YOU, the corporation has developed a
multimillion dollar trademark for its line of BUDWEISER beer and
related products.2 Imagine the reaction of the corporation upon
learning that a small, non-profit, floral organization decided to capital-
ize on the public's recognition of Anheuser-Busch's famous slogan in
a "Sweetest Week" campaign by advertising "THIS BUD'S FOR
YOU-And 11 More Rosebuds."'3
Although the uniqueness of Anheuser-Busch's slogan was dimin-
ished by the florist's use in the Ohio community, it was impossible for
the corporation to state a claim for relief.4 Anheuser-Busch could not
argue trademark infringement because beer and roses are clearly dis-
tinct goods that are unlikely to cause consumer confusion. There was
no evidence of actual confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the
"Sweetest Week" campaign nor was there any intent by the floral as-
1. This hypothetical is based on facts from a case decided prior to the enactment of the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act. At the time of the case, Ohio did not have a state anti-dilution
statute under which Anheuser-Busch could seek relief. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. The Florists
Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ohio, 1984).
2. Id. at 37.
3. Id. at 36. The florist advertised in Cleveland's daily newspaper, on local television commer-
cials, and on signs in the windows of local retailers. Id. The campaign to sell roses lasted for one
week in October of 1982. Id.
4. Id. at 38-39. The court was not persuaded that Anheuser-Busch would be likely to prevail
on its federal trademark infringement claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), common law trademark
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 43(a), or under Ohio unfair competition laws because they were
unable to establish likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. Id.
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sociation to deceive consumers as to the source or sponsorship of the
roses.5
However, despite the lack of infringement, an injury still occurs be-
cause Anheuser-Busch's mark ceases to be a unique identifier for its
products. By merely using THIS BUD'S FOR YOU as part of the
campaign, the florist was likely to create an instinctive mental associa-
tion with the famous BUDWEISER trademark. 6 Consequently, the
mark loses some of its cachet in the eyes of the public and possibly
some of its ability to act as a selling agent for BUDWEISER products.
Because of the strong secondary meaning embodied in
BUDWEISER, the public may wonder if the florist is being sponsored
or endorsed by Anheuser-Busch, and it may even decide to purchase
the roses based on the perceived affiliation with the brewing corpora-
tion. The relief Anheuser-Busch seeks is a federal or state dilution
action where likelihood of confusion and consumer deception is irrele-
vant. If the "Sweetest Week" campaign had occurred after 1995,
Anheuser-Busch would likely have been able to state a claim for relief
under the federal dilution statute.7
Although seven years have passed since the Federal Trademark Di-
lution Act8 (FTDA) was enacted, the judiciary is still largely uncom-
fortable with, and even openly hostile to, the dilution doctrine. Part
of the suspicion surrounding dilution derives from the fact that it es-
sentially "turn[s] traditional trademark law on its head." 9 For the first
time in the history of protecting trademarks, an owner does not need
to satisfy the likelihood of confusion standard that courts have be-
come accustomed to applying.' 0 Many critics fear that dilution will
ultimately turn trademarks into virtual monopolies that will suppress
5. See Anheuser-Busch, 603 F. Supp. at 38. As the court humorously noted, "No consumer
called any florist asking to be delivered a six-pack; nor did any consumer call Anheuser-Busch
seeking to purchase two dozen roses." Id.
6. Id. at 40. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim for product disparagement because pro-
moting roses in no way disparages Anheuser-Busch's product or slogan. Id. But see Chem.
Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1962) (allowing Anheuser-
Busch to enjoin defendant's use of the slogan "Where There's Life ... There's Bugs" as dispar-
aging of the slogan "Where There is Life ... There is Bud").
7. See Anheuser-Busch, 603 F. Supp. at 40. In the actual case, Anheuser-Busch's motion for a
preliminary injunction was denied. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000).
9. Karyn K. Ablin & Anil Koshy, A Matter of Opinion: Deciphering Dilution Under the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act, 20 Miss. C. L. REv. 61, 69 (1999).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (stating that "[tlhe term 'dilution' means the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception").
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competition because of the "extraordinary remedy"' available to suc-
cessful plaintiffs.12 The rationale underlying dilution, namely protect-
ing an owner's proprietary interest in the value of his trademark,
provokes additional criticism because it represents a departure from
the traditional justification of preventing consumer confusion and de-
ception.13 Critics of the theory believe that protecting trademarks in
this fashion will result in "exclusive property rights in gross," creating
a potent, anticompetitive tool.1 4
In order to combat the possibility of virtual trademark monopolies,
commentators have stressed the need for strict adherence to the
"fame" requirement embodied in the FTDA.1 5 However, rigorous ap-
plication of the fame requirement has proven difficult for courts due
to the lack of a clear and concrete definition in the statutory lan-
guage. 16 A court's task is further hindered by the fact that judges
have no guidelines to define the relevant market in which fame must
exist for a valid dilution claim.' 7 As a result, conflicting judicial theo-
ries have developed as a mechanism to identify famous marks eligible
for protection under the FTDA.18
11. See Courtland L Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J. I11,
133 (1998) (noting that "[i]f even a locally famous mark can preclude all other marks in every
other channel of trade, then conceivably every trademark can be used to create a monopoly in a
word or symbol-a proposition clearly contrary to the intent and practice of trademark law").
12. See generally Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REi,. 375 (1987) [hereinafter USTA Report].
13. Id. at 461 (stating that "[w]e believe that a higher standard [than fame among an 'appreci-
able number' of persons] should be employed to gauge the fame of a trademark eligible for this
extraordinary remedy"). See also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring proof of actual damage to avoid
creating 'property rights in gross' for the famous trademark).
14. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution
Statute Necessary?, 19 SETON HALL LEOIS. J. 433, 466-67 (1994) (noting that the "Supreme Court
has continuously held that the trademark right is not 'in gross' and not a copyright or a patent,
but that any rights to trademarks are appurtenant to the related business. The purpose is to
exclude others from confusing usages, not to grant a monopoly in the mark in gross.").
15. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 24:108 (4th ed. 1999) ("There can be little doubt that Congress sought to protect only a select
and narrow class of truly famous and well-recognized marks. Without such a requirement, an
anti-dilution statute becomes a rogue law that turns every trademark, no matter how weak, into
an anti-competitive weapon.").
16. Id. at §§ 24:90, 24:92. The FTDA embodied in the Lanham Act sets forth factors which
may be considered in a court's determination of fame but a court is not confined to that list and
may use any other factors it deems relevant in its analysis of famous trademarks. See infra note
116 and accompanying text.
17. See Times Mirror v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (Barry, J.,
dissenting). The dissent observed that "[I1t is possible to find virtually any mark to be 'famous'
within some market, depending on how narrowly that market is defined." Id.
18. See generally Ablin & Koshy, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing that "[j]udicial construction of
the Act is strangling the hope for a single, national standard of dilution. As cases applying the
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This Comment contrasts the "Niche Market Theory" and the "Gen-
eral Public Theory" as discussed in dilution cases. Part II provides a
general discussion of trademark law under the Lanham Act 19 and di-
lution theory, including judicial skepticism towards the doctrine.20
The section concludes with an examination of the statutory scope and
content of the FTDA, including the ambiguity of the fame require-
ment.21 Part III of this Comment examines the Niche Market Theory
and the General Public Theory, analyzing relevant cases to predict
what theory should be adopted as the best way to ascertain proper
candidates for federal dilution protection.22 Part IV conducts an anal-
ysis of the pertinent themes present in the case law in an effort to
articulate arguments in support of and in opposition to the competing
theories.2 3 In conclusion, this Comment argues against continued use
of the Niche Market Theory because it erroneously uses a traditional
infringement analysis and, in reality, amounts to the traditional likeli-
hood of confusion standard in disguise. 24 Finally, this Comment advo-
cates adoption of the General Public Theory for determining fame,
and it proposes a test to identify famous trademarks that should be
eligible for protection under the FTDA.25
II. BACKGROUND
The background section will lay the foundation necessary to under-
stand the Niche Market Theory and the General Public Theory. It
will begin with a brief history of trademark law under the Lanham Act
and dilution theory in general. A discussion of the major bases of
judicial skepticism will precede an examination of the statutory scope
and content of the FTDA. This will include the method of interpreta-
tion being used by some courts to address federal dilution claims. Fi-
nally, this section will examine the ambiguity surrounding the fame
requirement of the FTDA as a reason for the development of compet-
ing theories to determine whether a trademark is famous enough to
qualify for FTDA protection.
[FTDA] wind their way through the federal judicial system, courts have interpreted the Act in
dramatically disparate ways"). See also Mark R. Becker, Streamlining The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act to Apply to Truly Famous Marks, 85 IowA L. REV. 1387, 1395 (2000) (noting that
"since the FTDA has been in force, courts have made scores of fame determinations").
19. See Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (amended 1988).
20. See infra notes 26-86 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 87-121 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 122-286 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 287-370 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 371-380 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 381-394 and accompanying text.
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A. Trademark Law Under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act governs the body of federal trademark law. A
trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device which serves as a
signal to consumers that a product is coming from a single though
possibly anonymous source. ' 26 In order to qualify for federal registra-
tion, the mark must be either inherently distinctive 27 or have acquired
secondary meaning28 in the eyes of the public. 29 Trademarks often
function as selling agents for a business' goods and services and, con-
sequently, are often viewed as lucrative business assets. 30 A trade-
mark helps consumers to identify and distinguish products and
facilitates purchases of goods that have been satisfactory to the con-
sumer in the past.31 Consumers may also rely on trademarks as a
promise that a product will retain a consistent level of quality over
time.32 Therefore, the quintessential purpose of the Lanham Act is to
prevent consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of
goods. 33 In addition, secondary policy rationales for protecting trade-
marks include protection of the owner's property rights in the mark,3 4
26. Id. at § 1127. The Lanham Act defines a "trademark" as any word, name, symbol, or
device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of goods, even if that source is unknown. Id.
27. See Reichman, supra note 11, at 111 (citing Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123
F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 1997)). "To function as a trademark, the word or symbol must be distinc-
tive enough to identify and distinguish the goods with which it is associated, as opposed to simply
describing the goods or serving as a generic name for the goods." Id.
28. Id. "For descriptive marks to be protected, they must have acquired "secondary meaning"
- i.e., when after extensive use and advertisement, consumers associate the mark with only one
source." Id.
29. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. For registration requirements, see § 1051-1096.
30. See generally Becker, supra note 18, at 1389. See also Reichman, supra note 11, at 111
(stating that "[a] trademark is that which makes tomorrow's business something more than an
accident") (citing United States Trademark Association, Trademarks in Advertising & Selling
(1996)).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (describing a trademark as a "word, name, symbol or device
... to identify and distinguish ... goods and services). See also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark
Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pri'r. L. REV.
789, 790-91 (1997).
32. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 2:4. "Trademarks create an incentive to keep up a
good reputation for a predictable quality of goods. An important purpose underlying trademark
law is the protection of an owner's investment in the quality of the mark and the quality of the
goods or services the mark identifies." Id.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The "intent of this Act is to regulate commerce within the
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
commerce ... to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to pre-
vent fraud and deception in such commerce." Id.
34. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 2:1.
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economic efficiency, 35 and universal notions of justice and fair
competition. 36
Traditional trademark infringement "protects the goodwill property
rights of the trademark owner and the corresponding right of the pub-
lic to be free from confusion, deception, and mistake. ' 37 At the heart
of an infringement action is the notion of preventing consumer confu-
sion that results in unfair competition. 38 It is certainly unfair to the
trademark owner if others may freely use and benefit from the good-
will of a mark he has developed. Therefore, the standard for trade-
mark infringement is based on a "likelihood of confusion" 39 for an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent consumers.40 Infringement
may occur if the consumer is confused as to the source, sponsorship,
or endorsement of the goods.4 1 Consequently, the plaintiff must pre-
sent evidence that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause
confusion in order to state a claim for trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act.42
35. Id. at § 2:3 (citing microeconomic theory to discuss the dual function performed by trade-
marks in the market as: (1) encouraging the production of quality products; and (2) reducing
customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions). See also id. at §§ 2:4-2:5.
36. Id. at § 2:7. McCarthy explains that "[a] basic aspect of the United States economy is that
of the market place policed by laws that set a minimum level of fair competition. The law of
trademarks is but a branch of this broader area called Unfair Competition or Unfair Trade Prac-
tices." Id. See generally Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269
U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
37. JEROME GILSON, 2 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.12(1)(c)(a), at 2-255-56
(Release No. 38, 1997).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000):
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof ... [that] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
39. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961) (setting forth the factors used to assess likelihood of confusion in
infringement cases).
40. See Becker, supra note 18. at 1390. '"Infringement Theory] entitles a trademark holder to
prevent competitors from using the original owner's mark on their own product in order to
deceive the consumer, divert sales from the original owner, and increase their own profits."
(citing Patrick M. Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. CoLo. L. REV.
295 (1999)) (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 23:1).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(a) (2000).
42. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at §§ 23:1, 2:8. "Today, the keystone of that portion of
unfair competition law which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion
in the minds of the buying public." Id.
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B. Dilution Theory
The father of dilution theory, Frank Schechter, defined dilution as
the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-com-
peting goods."' 43 The catalyst behind Schechter's work was his con-
cern that trademark law failed to provide a remedy for the use of a
unique mark on non-competing goods. 44 Schechter posited
(1) that the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power;
(2) that this selling power depends for its psychological hold upon
the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon which it is
used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity; (3) that
such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired by its use upon
either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the degree of its
protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the
efforts of ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different
from other marks.45
In 1932, Schechter proposed a federal law that would embody his con-
ception of dilution, thereby preventing injury to the goodwill or repu-
tation of arbitrary or fanciful marks.46 Despite Schechter's persuasive
efforts, his proposal was rejected, 47 and his ideas did not gain wide-
spread acceptance in state legislatures for approximately twenty
years.48
43. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV 813,
825 (1927). For additional definitions of dilution, see also Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Rede-
fined for the Year 2000, 37 Hous. L. REV. 729, 731 (2000) (arguing "that the owner of a strong,
unique marketing symbol should be entitled, incipiently, to prevent impairment of the symbol's
communicative clarity by its substantial association with another's similar symbol, particularly
when there is an element of misappropriation"); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp.
116, 119 (W.D.N.Y 1989) (analogizing that dilution is similar to destroying a building "stone by
stone"); H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (describ-
ing dilution as "an infection which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising
value of [a] mark"); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, 42 N.Y.2d 538 (N.Y.
1977) (describing dilution as the "gradual whittling away of distinctiveness caused by a cancer-
like growth used on dissimilar products or services"); Augusta Nat'l, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut.
Life. Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 210 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (noting that dilution also prevents "an erosion of
the 'magic' of the status the mark signifies").
44. See Schechter, supra note 43, at 825. Schechter states that the "more distinctive or unique
the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for
protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with which
it has been used." Id.
45. Id. at 831.
46. See generally Frank I. Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trademark Protection, 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 60, 84-85 (1936).
47. Id.
48. See Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108, 109-
110 (1993).
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However, the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA) in 1995 transformed Schechter's vision into federal law. 49
The FTDA defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a fa-
mous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of confusion, mis-
take, or deception." 50 The FTDA recognizes a trademark owner's
proprietary interest and sanctions misappropriation of the goodwill
connected with a trademark.51
As Schechter noted in his initial proposal, the value of a trademark
lies in its ability to act as a selling agent for goods and services. 52
However, the mark can only function in such a capacity if a mental
association is created between the public and the plaintiff's goods.53 If
the trademark becomes associated in the public's perception with an-
other product, the plaintiff's mark fails to serve as a unique identifier,
and consequently, the plaintiff will likely sell fewer goods.54 The re-
sult is inequitable to a plaintiff who has invested substantial time and
money in cultivating a unique trademark.55
49. Swann, supra note 43, at 772. Swann argues that Schechter's original rationale for justify-
ing dilution is outdated in a contemporary market. Id. Swann says that "[t]oday, producer and
product are, at best, starting points; a brand's promise extends beyond, and can exist apart from,
its creator and the market entry to which it is affixed. The focus ... should be on maintaining
the mark's communicative clarity ... not on preserving the power of its link to a singly-made
[sic] good." Id.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
51. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:71. The rationale for dilution protection is based
on the premise that "gradual diminution or whittling away of the value of a trademark ...
constitutes an invasion of the senior user's property right and goodwill in his mark [that] gives
rise to an independent wrong." Id.
52. See Schechter, supra note 43, at 831-32.
53. See Reichman, supra note 11, at 112. "When confronted with the senior mark, although
not confused, consumers will not immediately form a mental association between the senior
trademark and the product it identifies." Id. The Fourth Circuit's test for dilution is (1) a suffi-
cient similarity between the junior and senior marks to evoke an "instinctive mental association"
of the two by a relevant universe of consumers which (2) is the effective cause of (3) an actual
lessening of the senior mark's selling power, expressed as "its capacity to identify and distinguish
goods and services." Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
54. See Ablin & Koshy, supra note 9, at 67. "Protection against dilution was needed to guard
not so much against a consumer's inability to determine the source of a product, but rather
against the loss of the immediate favorable mental association, in the mind of the consumer,
between an owner's trademark and its products by preserving the singularity and strength of that
connection." Id. (quoting generally from Schechter, supra note 43, at 830).
55. See generally Illinois High School Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir.
1996) (justifying dilution as a protection against a "proliferation of borrowings that ... are so
numerous as to deprive the mark of its distinctiveness and hence impact"); and Wedgewood
Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 294 Or. 493 (1983) (holding dilution to be a remedy for "diminution of
plaintiff's name as an advertising tool").
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There are two distinct ways in which a trademark may become di-
luted under the FTDA. 56 The traditional injury caused by dilution oc-
curs through blurring.57 Blurring occurs when a person uses the
plaintiff's famous mark without authorization on unrelated goods or
services from those on which the trademark was originally applied. 58
Consequently, the trademark loses its unique significance in the pub-
lic's perception and its ability to distinguish the plaintiff's goods is
weakened. 59 The danger of dilution by blurring occurs over the
course of many unauthorized uses,60 "[l]ike being stung by a hundred
bees, significant injury is caused by the cumulative effect, not by just
one. ''61 If over time the plaintiff's mark becomes associated with a
multitude of goods and services, its function as an advertising agent
for the plaintiff's goods will be obliterated.62
Tarnishment is the second form of dilution that Congress intended
to address with the F"IDA.63 "The sine qua non of tarnishment is a
finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations through
defendant's use."' 64 Tarnishment occurs when the defendant's unau-
thorized use diminishes or degrades the positive associations invoked
by the plaintiff's trademark. 65 Dilution by tarnishment may occur in a
56. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 at 2. "The purpose of the [FTDA] is to protect famous trade-
marks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it,
even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion." Id. Cybersquatting may also give rise to a
federal dilution claim. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
57. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983). Examples of dilution
by blurring include BUICK aspirin, SCHLITZ varnish, KODAK pianos, and BULOVA gowns.
See also Becker, supra note 18, at 1397 (citing "PEPSI in-line skates, MICROSOFT lipstick,
KLEENEX machine guns, and JOCKEY automobile tires" as examples of dilution by blurring).
58. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:68 (stating that dilution occurs when customers
"see the plaintiff's mark used by other persons to identify other sources on a plethora of differ-
ent goods and services"). See also Becker, supra note 18, at 1397 (stating that "[b]lurring typi-
cally occurs when a person uses a famous trademark in connection with goods or services
unrelated to the goods or services upon which the trademark was originally applied").
59. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:94. Dilution by blurring is a "lessening of the
capacity or ability of the mark to be strong as a commercial symbol and identifier." Id.
60. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:94. See also Illinois High School Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 244
(holding that the "theory of dilution by blurring is that if one small user can blur the sharp focus
of the famous mark to uniquely signify one source, then another and another small user can and
will do so").
61. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:94.
62. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 449. The Fourth Circuit has adopted the most stringent
view of dilution under the FTDA by requiring proof of actual damage to the famous trademark.
"The plaintiff must prove that defendant's usage has caused 'actual economic harm to the fa-
mous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its
goods or services." Id. at 456.
63. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 at 2 (stating that "[tihe definition of dilution is designed to
encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the courts").
64. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996).
65. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:95.
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number of different ways. First, the plaintiff's mark may be tarnished
when the defendant parodies the trademark in a negative fashion. 66
For example, L.L. Bean alleged tarnishment when Drake Publishers, a
company specializing in adult erotic entertainment, parodied its trade-
mark in an article entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex Cata-
logue."' 67 The defendant may also tarnish the plaintiff's trademark by
using it on products of a lesser or "shoddy" quality. 68 In addition, a
trademark may be tarnished because the defendant uses it in connec-
tion with obscenity, pornography, or drug-related material.69
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition compares and con-
trasts the two forms of dilution:
Tarnishment and [blurring] although conceptually distinct, both un-
dermine the selling power of a mark, the latter by disturbing the
conditioned association of the mark with the prior user and the for-
mer by displacing the positive with negative associations. Thus,
tarnishment and [blurring] reduce the value of the mark to the
trademark owner.70
While the injury to the famous trademark's selling power occurs in
distinct ways, both tarnishment and blurring are actionable under the
FTDA. 7' However, the classic dilution scenario occurs when a famous
trademark is used on dissimilar, non-competing goods and services in
such a way as to weaken the mental association between the plaintiff's
product and his trademark. Therefore, this Comment will focus on
dilution by blurring for its examination of the Niche Market Theory
and the General Public Theory.72
66. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied
483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
67. Id. at 26.
68. See GILSON, supra note 37, at § 5.12(l)(c)(i), at 5-263.
69. See Becker, supra note 18, at 1398. An example of tarnishment because of association
with pornography was discussed in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). In that case, the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders sued Pussycat Cinema
for tarnishment when the film portrayed the cheerleaders' uniform in a pornographic context.
As noted by the court,
[The] plot, to the extent there is one, involves a cheerleader at a fictional high school,
Debbie, who has been selected to become a 'Texas Cowgirl.' In order to raise enough
money to send Debbie, and eventually the entire squad to Dallas, the cheerleaders
perform sexual services for a fee. The movie consists largely of a series of scenes graph-
ically depicting the sexual escapades of the 'actors.' In the movie's final scene, Debbie
dons a uniform strikingly similar to that worn by the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders and
for approximately twelve minutes of film footage engages in various sex acts while clad
or partially clad in the uniform.
Id. at 202. See also ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 137 (1996).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §25, cmt. c (1995).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 at 2.
72. See infra notes 122-286.
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Despite the existence of dilution theory for the past seventy-five
years, some courts still remain confused on the distinction between
dilution and infringement. Although the two theories are not mutu-
ally exclusive, the mental state required for dilution is inconsistent
with the mental state required for infringement. 73 If a trademark has
been diluted, the public is not confused as to the origin or sponsorship
of the defendant's mark because the context in which it is used is com-
pletely unrelated. 74 Instead, the consumer recognizes that the goods
are from independent sources; the problem occurs because the plain-
tiff's mark is now associated with a new and different source.75 Dilu-
tion presumes a mental association in a reasonable buyer's mind
between the two parties and their marks, but the association is not so
strong as to cause the buyer to believe the goods are coming from a
single source. 76 In the words of the Restatement,
In order for dilution to occur, prospective purchasers must make a
mental connection between the plaintiff's mark and the designation
used by the defendant. The connection, however is not that which
serves as the basis of liability for trademark infringement-the mis-
taken belief that the plaintiff is in some way associated with defen-
dant's goods-but rather is the accurate recognition that a mark
associated with the plaintiff is now also in use as an identifying sym-
bol by another.77
Yet despite these differences, courts have continued to ignore the
distinction between infringement and dilution, and courts have failed
to appreciate the different protection offered by each theory. Many
judicial opinions appear to require likelihood of confusion for federal
dilution cases, even though Congress explicitly rejected such a stan-
dard78 and excluded it from the statutory language of the FTDA.79
73. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:70. For an example of how infringement and dilu-
tion can coexist, see David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV.
531, 542-46 (1991).
74. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:70.
75. Id.
76. Id. See Fruit of the Loom Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring a
"subliminal connection in a buyer's mind between the two parties' uses of their marks"); Richard
J. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUo. 67, 75 (1992) (noting that "the economy
[value] is less when, because the trademark has other associations, a person seeing it must think
for a moment before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service").
77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. f.
78. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3. "The purpose of [the FTDA] is to protect famous trade-
marks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it,
even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion." Id.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). "Dilution means the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of ...
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id.
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C. Judicial Skepticism of the Dilution Doctrine
Judicial skepticism of dilution began before the passage of the
FTDA, and many court opinions display reluctance to move away
from traditional infringement theory. "[T]he concept [of dilution]
seemingly has remained so misunderstood or unpalatable to the judi-
cial taste that it largely has been ignored by the courts despite the
plain dictates of statutes and the voluminous urgings of the academ-
ics." 80 The heart of this skepticism is based on the tension underlying
all of intellectual property law, namely the "right versus access" de-
bate.81 Critics feel that by granting property rights in trademarks, di-
lution is taking too much out of the public domain and unduly
restricting public access to communicative material.82
Many judges view [dilution] with distaste because they see a plain-
tiff who uses the dilution theory as asking for too much of a zone of
exclusivity for the trademark. It is difficult to dispute that applica-
tion of dilution theory lays a heavy hand upon one who adopts the
trade name or trademark of another.83
This unfettered skepticism has been allowed to flourish in the pres-
ence of statutory ambiguity regarding the scope of dilution. The Re-
80. Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection,
Its Progress and Prospects, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 607, 610-11 (1977).
81. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at §§ 1:26 et. seq. See also Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The general rule of law is,
that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use."); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164, (1989) (reiterating the need to main-
tain a balance between free competition and fair competition and between the policy of the
public domain and the policy of intellectual property).
82. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at §§ 1:26 et. seq. Perhaps underlying this judi-
cial skepticism is also a desire to maintain the distinction between patents and copyrights from
trademarks. The owners of the former types of intellectual property, specifically patent owners,
must satisfy heightened registration requirements in order to protect their property. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2000) (setting forth the requirements for patentability); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101
- 105 (2000) (setting forth the requirements for copyrightability). These authors and inventors
are entitled to a limited monopoly in exchange for their contribution and advancement of sci-
ence and the arts. See U.S. CONsr., art. I, §8 cl. 8. (granting such protection "[t]o promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries").
However, a trademark is distinctly different from either a patent or a copyright. The registra-
tion requirements are certainly easier to satisfy. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1091. Moreover, there is
no constitutional policy basis for granting monopoly-like protection because the trademark
owner is not giving something back to the general public per se. Furthermore, there is no statu-
tory limitation on the duration of a trademark provided that it remains in use in commerce. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059. Therefore, judges may be skeptical of dilution as a backdoor way of
obtaining a monopoly over a famous trademark that could last perpetually, without the corre-
sponding tangible benefits to the general public that patents and copyrights provide.
83. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:100. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319
F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
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statement supports the fact that judges have applied dilution theory
conservatively, if at all:
In apparent recognition that broad interpretation of the statutes
would undermine the balance between private and public rights that
has informed the traditional limits of trademark protection, courts
continue to confine the cause of action for dilution to cases in which
the protectable interest is clear and the threat of interference is
substantial.84
Earlier court opinions concur with this interpretation: "We feel con-
strained not to give [the statute] overly broad application lest it swal-
low up all competition in the claim of protection against trade name
infringement. '85 Although these comments were a product of state
court dilution opinions, the law under the FTDA does not appear
much clearer today. 86
D. Statutory Scope and Content of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act
The driving force behind the FTDA is to "protect famous trade-
marks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark
or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confu-
sion."'87 The proprietary interest to be protected is the "substantial
investment the owner has made ...and the commercial value and
aura of the mark itself."' 88 This represents a significant departure from
traditional trademark law, which protects the signaling capacity of a
mark to communicate to the consumer the source of the goods or ser-
vices.89 Essentially, the FTDA is guarding against unauthorized uses
of a mark, usually on unrelated, non-competing goods, that diminish
the uniqueness of a famous trademark in the public's perception. 90
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. b.
85. Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217 n.13 (N.D.
Cal. 1969). See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 434 F.2d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 1970)
("The law regarding the dilution doctrine is not altogether clear and cannot be readily summa-
rized except to say that it is an offshoot of the equitable considerations inherent in the concept of
unfair competition.").
86. See Reichman, supra note 11, at 111. "The dilution doctrine is widely misunderstood by
the courts, difficult to anticipate when counseling clients, and nearly impossible to apply as a
matter of proof in the context of a lawsuit." Id.
87. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3.
88. Id.
89. See Schechter, supra note 43, at 818. "The true functions of the trademark are, then, to
identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming
public." Id. See also supra notes 43-79 and accompanying text.
90. See Schechter, supra note 43, at 825.
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Congress enacted a federal dilution statute to address problems on
multiple levels.91 On a national scale, the substantial variation in state
anti-dilution statutes and remedies did not provide the desired level of
protection for trademark owners. 92 Prior to 1995, approximately half
of the states had an anti-dilution statute.93 As a result, trademarks
received "unpredictable and inadequate" protection from dilution,
and plaintiffs were "encourag[ed] to forum-shop," consequently in-
creasing the amount of litigation in the court system.94 Therefore, the
FTDA was designed as a mechanism to harmonize dilution protection
among the states by providing a uniform level of protection for all
federal claims. 95
In addition to its function of "bring[ing] uniformity and consistency
to the protection of famous trademarks," Congress noted that the
FTDA "is also consistent with [United States'] international obliga-
tions in the trademark area. '96 As a result, the FTDA parallels dilu-
tion protection guaranteed in international trade agreements such as
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) 97 and the Paris Convention. 98 A central concern was
that foreign countries would be "reluctant to change their laws to pro-
tect famous U.S. marks if the United States [did] not afford special
protection for such marks." 99 The FTDA reflects U.S. sentiment that
"famous marks should be protected regardless of whether the marks
are registered in the country where protection is sought." 100
91. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-374. See also Becker, supra note 18, at 1400.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3. "Presently, the nature and extent of the remedies against
trademark dilution varies from state to state and, therefore, can provide unpredictable and inad-
equate results for the trademark owner." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 4.
95. It is significant to note that Congress did not intend for the FTDA to preempt existing
state anti-dilution statutes. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 8. ("Unlike patent and copyright
laws, federal trademark law coexists with state trademark law, and it is to be expected that the
federal dilution statute should similarly coexist with state dilution statutes."). See also Becker,
supra note 18, at 1401.
96. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4. The Uruguay Round of the GATT agreement, of which
the U.S. is a member, provides dilution protection to famous marks. Id.
97. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
signed by members of GATT, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4. See also Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Famous Trademarks:
Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy, 64 BROOK. L.
REv. 423, 431-32 (1998). For example, Art 16(3) of TRIPS offers protection for "well-known"
trademarks. The FTDA helped bring the United States law up to a similar, though not identical,
level of protection with the international community. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000).
99. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4. See 141 CONG. REC. S19130 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
100. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4.
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The language of the FTDA provides,
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
ples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable,
to an injunction against another person's commercial use of a mark
or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.10'
A prima facie dilution case requires the plaintiff to establish the fol-
lowing: "(1) the mark is famous; (2) defendant is commercially using
the mark in interstate commerce; (3) defendant's use began after the
plaintiff's mark became famous; and (4) defendant's use causes dilu-
tion by lessening the capacity of the plaintiff's mark to identify and
distinguish its goods or services. '"102
When a court finds trademark infringement has occurred, the plain-
tiff has several avenues of relief. He may be entitled to an injunction
against the infringing conduct, 10 3 lost profits, damages and costs, attor-
ney's fees, and in the case of intentional infringement, treble dam-
ages. 10 4 Similarly, the typical remedy for federal dilution under the
Lanham Act is an injunction against the unauthorized use. 0 5 If the
plaintiff can prove the defendant "willfully intended" to trade on the
goodwill of the plaintiff's mark, additional remedies may be available
under section 1117(a) and section 1118 of the Lanham Act. 0 6 Under
those provisions, the plaintiff may be entitled to a monetary award or
to destruction of the diluting articles.'0 7 All remedies are "subject to
the discretion of the court and the principles of equity."' 0 8 This raises
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
102. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:89.
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2):
In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of a famous mark shall be enti-
tled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title unless the person
against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputa-
tion or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner
of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in section 1117(a)
and section 1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of
equity.
Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (stating that "the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover (1) defendant's
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action"); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1118 (stating that "the court may order ... the word, term, name, symbol, device, combination
thereof, designation, description, or representation that is the subject of the violation, or any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof, and all plates, molds, matrices,
and other means of making the same, shall be delivered up and destroyed").
107. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2).
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an important issue when the Niche Market Theory is used to prove
dilution. Because it is within the judge's discretion to fashion an equi-
table remedy, it is therefore possible for the scope of an injunction to
be substantially broader than the market in which the plaintiff proved
the fame of its trademark. 0 9 This problem receives additional discus-
sion throughout the course of this Comment as many critics of the
theory have focused on the "extraordinary remedy" that dilution
provides. 0
E. Ambiguity of the Fame Requirement
Judges continue to struggle with striking the right balance between
the trademark owner's rights and what material should remain in the
public domain to serve the best interests of society.'' The FTDA re-
quires a trademark to be famous in order to bring a claim for federal
relief. 1 2 Therefore, the highest hurdle that dilution plaintiffs must
face is proving whether a trademark is "famous" enough to be di-
luted. 1 3 However, a fundamental problem with the FTDA is that
there is no "register of famous marks" per se, and therefore, fame
must be determined on an ad hoc basis." 4 "This uncertainty in-
troduces the major source of unpredictability into applying the law
and giving legal advice." '" 5 In determining whether a mark is famous,
109. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that it was
within the discretion of the district court to limit injunctive relief to the state of New York
"notwithstanding the fact that district courts have in other circumstances granted nationwide
injunctive relief on dilution claims").
110. See generally Ablin & Koshy, supra note 9, at 61; Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 449; and
Schechter, supra note 43, at 813.
111. See MCCAR[HY, supra note 15, at § 24:90 ("While traditional trademark law rests prima-
rily on a policy of protection for customers from mistake and deception, anti-dilution law more
closely resembles an absolute property right in a trademark.").
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
113. Id. For a thorough listing of cases examining the fame requirement by circuit, see
Becker, supra note 18, at 1462-64.
114. Examples of Famous Trademarks include: Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F.
Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964) ("TIFFANY"); Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir
1963) ("POLAROID"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y
1972) ("COCA-COLA"); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y 1989)
("KODAK").
Examples of Marks held not to be famous include: Appleseed Foundation Inc. v. Appleseed
Institute Inc., 981 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1997)( "APPLESEED" for a public advocacy group);
Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("COLUMBIA" for healthcare services); Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp.
1030 (D. Haw. 1996) ("STAR MARKETS" for a supermarket chain in Hawaii); S Industries,
Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. I11. 1998) ("STEALTH" for
home and sporting goods).
115. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:90.
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the FTDA suggests, but does not limit, the court's analysis to eight
factors.1 16
The qualities necessary for a trademark to be famous have varied
among different courts. It is well established that in order for a trade-
mark to be eligible for registration, it must be distinctive.' 1 7 There-
fore, it seems that something more is required by the FTDA's use of
the term "famous." It is logically consistent that a "trademark cannot
be famous unless it is distinctive, but it can be distinctive without be-
ing famous. By definition, all trademarks are distinctive-very few
are famous."'1 8 The Restatement has elaborated on this point:
Not all trademarks warrant protection against dilution of the mark's
distinctiveness. In applying the anti-dilution statutes, most courts
require that the mark possess a degree of distinctiveness beyond
that needed for the designation to qualify as a valid trademark. As
a general matter, a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted
by a non-confusing use if the mark retains its source significance
when encountered outside the context of the goods or services with
which it is used by the trademark owner. 1 9
If a trademark retains its source significance only when used in the
context of the owner's goods and services, it is merely distinctive and
not "famous" for dilution purposes.120 A famous trademark must be
capable of blurring in the classic context, when the mark is used on
unrelated goods yet still causes a mental association between the pub-
lic's perception and the plaintiff's goods.12' Application of the fame
requirement is at the core of inconsistent judicial interpretations, and
116. Id. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider fac-
tors such as, but not limited to the following:
a) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
b) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used;
c) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
d) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
e) the channels of trade for the goods and services with which the mark is used;
f) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
g) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
h) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
117. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
118. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:91.
119. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. e.
120. Id. "A mark that evokes an association with a specific source only when used in connec-
tion with the particular goods or services that it identifies is ordinarily not sufficiently distinctive
to be protected against dilution." Id.
121. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3. "[Dilution] applies when the unauthorized use of a
famous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies something unique, singular.
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it is the reason that some courts are grasping at the Niche Market
Theory as a tool for applying federal dilution law.
III. NICHE MARKET THEORY & GENERAL PUBLIC THEORY
This section will provide a brief overview of the niche marketing
strategy from a business perspective. The concept of a niche market
will then be discussed within the context of federal dilution jurispru-
dence as a mechanism for identifying famous trademarks that are eli-
gible for protection under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA). Finally, the section will discuss relevant case law from those
federal courts that have adopted the Niche Market Theory.
A. Niche Market Theory
The trend in niche marketing is being driven by social and techno-
logical changes that make advertising to a larger, homogeneous mar-
ket less effective.122 The niche strategy is designed to serve the needs
of a narrow market segment that is unattractive to and neglected by
larger competitors. 123 A niche may be limited to a specific consumer
group, geographic area, product feature, or price-quality level.1 24 Typ-
ically, a small company or a division of a large corporation identifies
an unfulfilled need in the market and targets products towards that
specific group of customers.125 The niche must be of sufficient size to
be profitable, but small enough to be unattractive to larger competi-
tors. 126 Because of its specialized nature, there are two inherent risks
of the strategy: "1) a larger competitor becomes interested in the
niche and decides to pursue its customers; and 2) the niche market
or particular .... Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by
another's use." Id.
122. See David Shani & Sujana Chalassani, Exploiting Niches Using Relationship Marketing, 8
J. OF Bus. & INDUSTRIAL MKTG, 58 (1993). The authors cite "[an] increased number of women
in the workforce, the changing family unit, the ageing of the population, the rise in the ethnic
population, and the shrinkage of the middle class" as factors creating a need for niche marketing.
Id. at 58.
123. MARK N. CLEMENTE, THE MARKETING GLOSSARY 235 (1992).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Shani & Chalassani, supra note 122, at 59. The authors describe the "ideal niche"
with the following characteristics:
(1) The niche is of sufficient size and purchasing power to be profitable;
(2) The niche has growth potential;
(3) The niche is of negligible interest to competitors;
(4) The firm should have the required skills and resources to exploit the niche; and
(5) The niche should provide entry barriers for competitors through accumulated cus-
tomer goodwill.
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evaporates because of a shift in attitudes or preferences. '' 127 Conse-
quently, companies who employ this type of marketing tend to safe-
guard their interests by engaging in "multiple niching. 11 28 The niche
theory will continue to increase in popularity and importance as the
business world pursues the "ideal niche" of establishing relationships
and fulfilling the needs of individual consumers.1
29
In the context of dilution jurisprudence, the Niche Market Theory
has been used to identify famous trademarks for purposes of the
FTDA's fame requirement. Some courts are willing to protect trade-
marks that are widely recognized in a niche market, even though the
mark is not famous to the general public. 130 For example, a manufac-
turer of pads for dry cleaning presses could claim that his trademark is
famous within the niche of dry cleaning stores. 13' He may present
evidence that his green-gold pads are widely recognized by dry clean-
ers, because they have acquired secondary meaning and serve a source
identification function. Therefore, the pads should be eligible for pro-
tection under the Niche Market Theory, even though they are not rec-
ognized by or famous to the general public. In the following dilution
cases, courts have applied the Niche Market Theory.
1. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 132
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit offered
limited support for the Niche Market Theory by recognizing that dilu-
tion may occur with trademarks of competing products. 133 In Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., Pepperidge Farm argued that Nabisco's
"Catdog" snack was diluting its trademark in Goldfish crackers.
1 34
Pepperidge Farm has marketed and sold its fish-shaped, cheddar
cheese flavored crackers under the GOLDFISH trademark since
127. Id. at 65. See generally P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS, PLANNING,
IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL (7th ed. 1990).
128. See CLEMENTE, supra note 123, at 235. "Multiple niching" refers to the strategy of mar-
keting to more than one specialized group of consumers in order to assure a customer base for
the business. Id.
129. See Shani & Chalassani, supra note 122, at 66. See also G. Kauffman, Direct Marketers
Face Some New Realities, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, 21-22 (June 27); R.S Sheila, How General Foods
Uses Direct Marketing to Make $$$$, CREATIVE FORUM, 3-4 (Nov.); G.A. Michaelson, Niche
Marketing in the Trenches, MARKETING COMM. 19-24 (June).
130. See infra notes 133-209 and accompanying text.
131. This example is based on Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159
(1995) (finding that "color alone" can serve as a trademark in an action for trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition).
132. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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1962.' 35 In 1994, Pepperidge Farm spent more than $120 million mar-
keting its crackers nationwide and recorded net sales of $200 million
per year from 1995 through 1998.136 Nabisco's snack was developed in
the spring of 1998 to promote a popular Nickelodeon cartoon called
"Catdog."' 137 Half of the snack mix consisted of "Catdog" characters
(a two-headed creature that is half cat and half dog), one quarter was
in the shape of bones, and one quarter was in the shape of fish. 138
Nabisco's snack mix was "intended to compete with other animal-
shaped cheese crackers marketed to children."'1 39
Pepperidge Farm argued that Nabisco was diluting the uniqueness
of its famous mark and brought suit under the IFTDA. 140 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a
preliminary injunction on Pepperidge Farm's behalf, holding that
Nabisco's snack would dilute the distinctive quality of the GOLD-
FISH trademark.14' In response to Nabisco's appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the preliminary injunction based on Pepperidge Farm's
likelihood of success on its dilution claim and prohibited distribution
of the "Catdog" snack by Nabisco.1 42
The Second Circuit assessed fame "in [its] ordinary English lan-
guage sense" and determined that GOLDFISH qualified as a famous
trademark. 43 In its defense, Nabisco argued that the IFTDA does not
apply to competing products. 44 The Second Circuit rejected this
claim and stated that "dilution can occur where the junior mark's use
competes directly with the senior's as well as where the junior use is in
a non-competing market."'1 45 In general, the more similar the prod-
ucts are to one another, the greater the likelihood of both confusion
and dilution.146 The court justified its interpretation as a means of
preventing situations where products were too remote to support an
infringement action but too close together to permit a finding of dilu-
tion. 147 Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
135. Id. at 212.
136. Id. at 212-13.
137. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213.
138. Id. at 213.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 212. See Nabisco, Inc., v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
142. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228-229.
143. Id. at 215.
144. Id. at 214.
145. Id. at 222.
146. Id.
147. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223.
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preliminary injunction enjoining the distribution of Nabisco's
crackers. 48
In addition to its basis for the Niche Market Theory, the Nabisco
decision illustrates the blurring of infringement and dilution actions by
judicial misinterpretation.1 49 After acknowledging that consumer con-
fusion was not a requirement for finding dilution, the Second Circuit
stated that "consumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the distinc-
tive selling power of a trademark."1 50 Furthermore, "a junior use that
confuses consumers as to which mark is which surely dilutes the dis-
tinctiveness of the senior mark.' 151
2. Syndicate Sales v. Hampshire Paper1 52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit contin-
ued to build upon the reasoning in Nabisco and offered explicit sup-
port for the Niche Market Theory in Syndicate Sales, Inc. v.
Hampshire Paper Corp.153 Syndicate sought FTDA protection for the
trade dress embodied in the configuration of its funeral flower bas-
kets.154 Syndicate Sales had been producing plastic baskets used to
hold floral arrangements since 1960.15 Its #92 and #95 baskets were
the most popular models, selling approximately fifty million and ten
million units respectively. 156 In 1994, Hampshire Paper began produc-
ing funeral baskets by using Syndicate Sales' #92 and #95 baskets as
models. 157 Both parties' products included teardrop-shaped handles,
round buckets or flute-shaped baskets, and bases with triangle sup-
ports, although each had slightly different latticework. 158 The compa-
nies competed by selling their respective products to wholesalers who,
in turn, sold the baskets, which were contained in their original pack-
ages, to retailers. 159
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indi-
ana held that Syndicate's trade dress failed to satisfy the threshold
fame requirement. 160 The district court rejected the Niche Market
148. Id. at 229.
149. See infra notes 358-370 and accompanying text.
150. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219.
151. Id.
152. 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 635.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 635.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Theory because "fame in such a niche market [wholesalers and retail
florists] cannot be sufficient to establish fame for the purposes of the
FTDA." 161
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit reexamined the issue of fame in a niche market and tried to rec-
oncile the conflicting lines of authority regarding the threshold fame
requirement. In doing so, the court distinguished between two differ-
ent contexts in which dilution may occur:
Cases holding that niche-market fame is insufficient generally ad-
dress the context in which the plaintiff and defendant are using the
mark in separate markets. On the other hand, cases stating that
niche-market renown is a factor indicating fame address a context
... in which the plaintiff and defendant are using the mark in the
same or related markets.' 62
In further support for the validity of the Niche Market Theory, the
Seventh Circuit used fame factor (f) from the FTFDA,' 6 3 which is de-
fined as "the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought."' 164 The court implied that this
factor justified limiting fame to a specialized market. t 65 While the
Seventh Circuit accepted fame within a niche market if the parties'
trademarks were used in the same market, it rejected defining that
specialized market by a geographical area.166 The court held that the
legislative history makes clear that Congress intended that in order to
be "famous," a mark must be used in a substantial segment of the
United States. 67 However, fame may be "limited to those engaged
on a regular basis in commercial activity involving this product"
within that substantial segment. 168
The Seventh Circuit held that because the parties' flower baskets
were competing in the wholesale and retail florist market, the Niche
Market Theory was appropriate. 69 The case was remanded to the dis-
trict court to assess whether Syndicate's trade dress was famous within
161. Id. at 640.
162. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 640.
163. For the FTDA "fame factors," see supra note 116.
164. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 639.
165. Id. at 641. "Moreover, one of the factors in §1125(c) [factor f] for determining the exis-
tence of fame indicates that fame may be constricted to a particular market." Id.
166. Id. at 641 n.7. The court "[didi not mean to imply that the market may be limited geo-
graphically to a single local area." Id.
167. See generally H.R. Ri,. No. 104-374.
168. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 641.
169. Id.
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the niche market.'70 Subsequently, the lower court found insufficient
evidence to establish fame even within the niche market of floral bas-
ket manufacturers and denied Syndicate's claim for dilution relief. 71
3. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News,
LLC
1 7 2
An opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit recently addressed the fame requirement using the Niche Mar-
ket Theory and relied upon the Nabisco and Syndicate Sales decisions
in support of its fame determination under the FTDA.173 In Times
Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, LLC, the trade-
marks at issue were THE SPORTING NEWS versus the THE LAS
VEGAS SPORTING NEWS.174 Times Mirror registered its mark,
THE SPORTING NEWS, in 1886 on the Principal Register for its
sporting periodical. 175 In 1997, the defendant changed the name of its
magazine from "Las Vegas Sports News" to LAS VEGAS SPORT-
ING NEWS (LVSN) with full knowledge of the plaintiff's registered
mark.176 An independent investigation revealed that newsstands were
confusing the two magazines despite subtle differences in their
targeted audiences. 177 For example, the defendant's magazine pro-
vided information on gambling, while the plaintiff's periodical was
solely designed to report sports news and statistics. 78
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania granted Times Mirror's request for a preliminary injunction
based on trademark dilution under the FTDA, and LVSN was en-
joined from using SPORTING NEWS in connection with its maga-
zine.179 On appeal, LVSN argued that THE SPORTING NEWS was
ineligible for FTDA protection because it was not famous to the gen-
eral public.180 The defendant argued, "Substantial case law indicates
170. See Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 2000 WL 1428665 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(holding that even under a niche theory plaintiff failed to provide evidence of fame for its trade
dress).
171. Id. at 19.
172. 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000).
173. See generally Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 208; and Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 633.
174. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 157.
175. Id. at 160.
176. Id. at 161.
177. Id at 162. In addition to the private investigator, John Kastberg, vice-president of Times
Mirror's The Sporting News, conducted his own investigation in New York during December of
1998. Id. At Grand Central Station, Penn Station, and Barnes & Noble, Kastberg asked for the
"Las Vegas Sporting News" and received the Times Mirror's "Sporting News." Id.
178. Id. at 160.
179. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 162.
180. Id. at 163-64.
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that marks famous in a specialized market, rather than well known to
the general public, should not be considered 'famous' under the fed-
eral dilution statute." 181
The Third Circuit rejected LVSN's argument and relied on previous
case law and the Restatement to adopt the Niche Market Theory. 182
Furthermore, the court found that the marks fit within the context
deemed appropriate by the Seventh Circuit for the Niche Market The-
ory because the trademarks competed in the same niche of sporting
periodicals. 183 Moreover, the Restatement bolsters this argument:
A mark that is highly distinctive only to a select class or group of
purchasers may be protected from diluting uses directed at that par-
ticular class or group. For example, a mark may be highly distinc-
tive among purchasers of a specific type of product. In such
circumstances, protection against a dilution of the mark's distinc-
tiveness is ordinarily appropriate only against uses specifically di-
rected at that particular class of purchasers. 184
However, the court failed to consider an earlier section of the Restate-
ment's comment that questioned the niche theory, stating that "a
mark that evokes an association with a specific source only when used
in connection with the particular goods or services it identifies is ordi-
narily not sufficiently distinctive to be protected against dilution."'185
Ultimately, the Third Circuit accepted fame within the niche market
as sufficient to state a claim for federal trademark dilution under the
FTDA.186 The court stated, "We are persuaded that a mark not fa-
mous to the general public is nevertheless entitled to protection from
dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are operating in the
same or related markets, so long as the plaintiff's mark possesses a
high degree of fame in its niche market."' 87 The court reasoned that
Times Mirror and LVSN competed within the sporting periodicals
market. 188 Within that limited market, THE SPORTING NEWS is a
famous trademark, even though it may be an unrecognizable trade-
181. Id. at 164 (citing Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 488, 503 (E.D. Va. 1999) (discussing but not specifically adopting or rejecting the Niche
Market Theory because the plaintiff was unable to prove fame even within a niche market)).
182. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 164-165.
183. Id.
184. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. e.
185. Id.
186. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 165.
187. Id. at 164.
188. Id. at 165.
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mark to the general public.' 89 Therefore, Times Mirror was entitled to
relief under the FTDA. 190
In contrast, Judge Barry's dissenting opinion articulated a compel-
ling argument for rejecting the Niche Market Theory.191 The dissent
questioned whether the proprietary interest underlying dilution
should even be protected by the law.' 92 The dissent noted that
"[d]ilution is not concerned with protecting against public deception;
it benefits only a coterie of American business elite, not the general
public."' 93 However, despite the apprehension dilution critics may
still harbor towards the theory, the FTIDA is federal law and the dis-
sent acknowledged that judges must find a mechanism to rein in its
potential anticompetitive power. 194 One feasible way to accomplish
this objective is to strictly interpret the fame requirement under the
FTDA.
The dissent began by emphasizing the critical role of the fame re-
quirement in maintaining "an appropriate balance between free com-
petition and property rights."' 95 It is necessary for courts to scrutinize
fame using the statutory factors and any other relevant evidence to
determine if a trademark is entitled to FTDA protection. 96 It is not
enough for the court to give a cursory analysis to evidence of fame
and then state in conclusory terms that the trademark is famous. 97
189. Id.
190. Id. at 169.
191. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 170 (Barry, J.. dissenting).
192. Id.
193. JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE, §5.12[1][e] at 5-272 (1999).
194. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 171.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 172.
Courts thus far have shown little inclination to limit protection to the truly famous
marks envisioned by the drafters of the FTDA. Instead, the courts, when they ac-
knowledge the fame requirement at all, simply state a mark's fame in conclusory terms
without attention to the eight fame factors. Unless courts strictly adhere to the admit-
tedly vague dictates of the federal dilution statute, federal dilution protection will
surely give rise to a broad regime of trademark rights in gross.
Id.
197. As an example of the conclusory fame analysis, the dissent cited Gazette Newspapers,
Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688 (Dist. Ct. Md., 1996). Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 172. In
Gazette Newspapers, the parties owned local newspapers that circulated in adjacent counties
within the state of Maryland. The plaintiff's newspaper was titled GAZETTE NEWSPAPERS
and the defendant's newspaper was originally called "The New Paper." Gazette Newspapers, 934
F. Supp. at 691. The facts suggested that the publisher of the defendant's paper on multiple
occasions expressed an interest in merging the two newspapers as the counties were in many
respects a single community. After the plaintiff refused the merger offer, the defendant ran a
contest with its readers to come up with a new name for its paper, eventually selecting "THE
FREDERICK GAZETTE." Id. at 692. In response to the defendant's new name, the plaintiff
filed a suit alleging trademark infringement and federal dilution among other claims. Id.
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Furthermore, according to the Times Mirror dissent, in its most ba-
sic formulation, "Fame means FAME." 198 Only truly famous marks
should receive protection from dilution under the FTDA. 199 The dis-
sent stated that "[t]o save the dilution doctrine from abuse by plain-
tiffs whose marks are not famous and distinctive, a large neon sign
should be placed adjacent wherever the doctrine resides, reading: 'The
Dilution Rule: Only Strong Marks Need Apply." 200 The legislative
history of the FTDA provides ample support for this restrictive inter-
pretation.201 Moreover, "[t]he FTDA should be restricted to a narrow
category of marks, ensuring that it does not swallow infringement law
by allowing mark owners to end-run a likelihood of confusion analysis
which they fear-or indeed, know-they cannot win." °20 2 The dissent
was legitimately concerned that a plaintiff could bring a dilution ac-
tion in order to circumvent the necessity of proving a likelihood of
confusion in those cases where the marks appear on competing
goods. 20 3 In order to prevent this result, famous marks should be ones
After engaging in a thorough analysis of the elements necessary to prove infringement under
the Lanham Act, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland went on to con-
clude that the plaintiff had also established federal dilution. Id. at 696-97. After acknowledging
that likelihood of confusion was not an element of federal dilution, the court relied solely on its
previous infringement analysis to justify its finding of dilution. Id. The court noted, "[tihe fac-
tors to be considered under [the FTDA] are in large part the same factors I have already consid-
ered in evaluating plaintiff's claim for trademark infringement." Gazette Newspapers, 934 F.
Supp. at 697. The opinion lacked any discussion of the elements of an FTDA claim, and most
notably any consideration of the threshold fame requirement, despite the fact that the court
entered a preliminary injunction on dilution grounds. This case illustrates courts' tendencies to
rubber stamp dilution claims without engaging in any meaningful analysis of the claim. For a
similar case lacking a fame analysis, see Hasbro, Inc., v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., No.
96130, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
198. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 170 (Barry, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 171. "The legislative history of the Act is crystal clear that Congress intended
courts to be highly selective in determining which marks are famous and accorded those truly
famous marks an unprecedented degree of protection." Id.
200. Id. (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:108).
201. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 at 3; USTA Report, supra note 12, at 455 ("We therefore urge
the adoption of a highly selective federal dilution statute."); Report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the precursor to the FTDA ("The [FTDA] creates a highly selective federal cause
of action to protect federally registered marks that are truly famous from dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of the mark.").
202. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 171.
203. Id. at 174. Judge Barry noted, "the legislative history does not mention much less em-
brace a so-called 'niche market' theory of fame ... the [N]iche [M]arket [T]heory risks lowering
the bar for trademark protection unless it is applied prudently to cases which clearly call for such
analysis." Id. at 173.
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that have "long [been] associated in the public's eye with a particular
product and which immediately strike one as being truly famous.
20 4
In the dissent's opinion, the fundamental problem with the Niche
Market Theory is that any trademark can become famous by manipu-
lating the definition of the relevant market where fame appears. 20
5
Neither the FTDA nor its legislative history support defining a market
for fame that is less than a "substantial segment" of the United
States.206 After all, "[i]t is hard to conceive of any consumer goods or
services that are not in a narrow market of some type, be it luxury
cars, cameras, or sporting publications. ' 20 7 Therefore, when the par-
ties are using similar marks on similar goods in a narrowly defined
specialized market, it is a "garden variety infringement case."208 Fur-
thermore, because the Niche Market Theory is being restricted to
those cases where the trademarks are competing in the same market,
by definition all those claims can effectively be pursued as infringe-
ment claims rather than dilution claims. A statement of congressional
intent is illustrative on this point:
The FTDA was not designed for situations in which a truly famous
mark on dissimilar products deserves, but cannot receive, protection
under infringement law-those situations in which, for example, no
one would ever confuse the truly famous mark with the goods or
services to which it has been wrongly attached.209
B. General Public Theory
As illustrated above, critics of the Niche Market Theory advocate
that FTDA protection should be reserved for trademarks that are well
known to the general public.210 "[Trademarks] famous only in a spe-
204. Id. Judge Barry seemed to advocate reserving FTDA protection for trademarks that are
"household names." For example, the "New York Yankees" would be a famous trademark be-
cause even non-sports fans would be aware of it.
205. Id. at 174. "If marks can become 'famous' within some market, depending on how nar-
rowly that market is defined, then the FTDA will surely devour infringement law." Id.
206. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 641 n.7.
207. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173. See Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark
Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 133 (Spring 1998) ("It is possible to find virtually any mark to
be "famous" within some market, depending on how narrowly that market is defined.").
208. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173. "[Tlhe unauthorized use of a mark in the same or a
similar market is precisely what good old-fashioned infringement principles have traditionally
been there to remedy once actual confusion or likelihood of confusion has been shown, and
there is simply no need for dilution principles ... [IIf the parties here operate within the sports
periodicals market, then this case . . . is a garden variety infringement case." Id.
209. Id. at 173-74.
210. For cases in support of the General Public Theory, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural An-
swers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847-851 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding that PROZAC is a famous
trademark for dilution purposes because it is widely publicized and recognized by consumers
world-wide); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Co.
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cialized market, rather than well-known to the general public, should
not be considered 'famous' under the federal dilution statute. '211
Therefore, the General Public Theory requires a plaintiff to establish
fame on a national or even a global scale for a substantial segment of
the public. 21 2 Consumers will be familiar with a famous trademark
because of the extensive advertising and renown the owner has ac-
quired for its product.213 It is not a prerequisite that a consumer
purchase the famous product in order for dilution to occur; the fa-
mous mark must only be familiar to the consumer so that when an
unauthorized use of the mark occurs, he will instinctively associate the
junior mark with the famous mark. 214
Congressional intent seems to favor the General Public Theory.215
An examination of the cases that have applied the Niche Market The-
ory reveals that fame is only deemed sufficient within a specialized
market if the trademarks appear on competing goods or services. 216
However, the FTDA expressly states that dilution may occur regard-
less of the presence or absence of competition between the parties, or
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.217 In contrast, the pur-
pose of enacting the FTDA was to "protect famous trademarks from
1997) (rejecting the plaintiff's FTDA claim because its trademark had no fame outside of the
narrow market of hunting apparel).
211. Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
212. Id. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173 (Barry, J., dissenting). Judge Barry described fa-
nious trademarks as "names which have long been associated in the public's eye with a particular
company or a particular product and which immediately strike one as being truly famous." Id.
213. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4. "The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial
investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and the aura of the mark
itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain." Id.
214. See MCCARrHY, supra note 15, at § 24:70:
For dilution to occur, the relevant public must make some connection between the
mark and both parties.... [The] assumption is that the relevant public sees the junior
user's use, and intuitively knows, because of the context of the junior user's use, that
there is no connection between the owners of the respective marks.... [The result is]
the senior user's mark ... is weakened because the relevant public now also associates
that designation with a new and different source.
Id.
215. See supra notes 13 and 15. See also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3. "A federal dilution
statute is necessary because famous marks are ordinarily used on a nationwide basis." Id. The
legislative history uses DUPONT, BUICK and KODAK as examples of famous trademarks that
are used on a nationwide basis and familiar to the general public. Id. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 70. A trademark is sufficiently famous to be diluted under the FTDA "if the mark
retains its source significance when encountered outside the context of the goods or services with
which the mark is used by the trademark owner." Restatement, supra note 70, at cmt e.
216. See Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 633. Essentially the Seventh Circuit adopted the Niche
Market Theory only for cases in which the parties' products were competing in the same or
similar markets: "Cases holding that niche-market fame is insufficient generally address the
context in which the plaintiff and defendant are using the mark in separate markets." Id. at 640.
217. 15. U.S.C. § 1127.
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subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or
disparage it. ' ' 218 As noted by one court,
Given this Congressional purpose, it seems an odd act of statutory
interpretation that permits the owner of a famous mark to prevent
dilution by competitors in the owner's niche market, particularly
since in such an instance, relief would already be available in the
owner's market under an infringement theory. 219
1. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
220
Prior to the enactment of the FTDA, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided a seminal dilution case under
the New York state anti-dilution statute that addressed the issues un-
derlying the conflict between the Niche Market Theory and the Gen-
eral Public Theory.22' In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the plaintiff argued that Toyota's decision to use
LEXUS on a new line of luxury cars would cause dilution of the uni-
queness of its LEXIS trademark for a computerized legal research
system.222 Mead presented strong evidence to support the renown of
LEXIS in the relevant market of attorneys and accountants. 223 How-
ever, with regard to the general adult population, LEXIS was recog-
nized by only one percent of those surveyed, with half of that percent
being attorneys or accountants.2 24 Nevertheless, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined Toyota
from using LEXUS as the brand for its new luxury car under New
York's anti-dilution statute.225
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, citing a lack of the requisite
fame for relief under the FTDA.226 The court rejected the concept of
fame within a niche market: "[T]he fact that a mark has selling power
in a limited geographical or commercial area does not endow it with
secondary meaning for the public generally. '227 By examining the leg-
218. 141 CONG. REC. S19306, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch).
219. Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
220. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1028. "[Tlhe district court accepted studies that 76 percent of all attorneys associ-
ated LEXIS with specific attributes of the service provided by Mead." Id.
224. Id.
225. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). New York's anti-dilution statute can be found at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-i.
226. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031. "It is quite apparent that the general public associates
nothing with LEXIS ... [therefore] we hold that Toyota did not violate [New York's anti-dilu-
tion statute]. Id.
227. Id. at 1030.
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islative history behind the New York statute, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that dilution was intended to prevent "the whittling away of an
established trademark's selling power and value through its unautho-
rized use by others upon dissimilar products. '228 Consequently, the
court held that "if a mark circulates only in a limited market, it is
unlikely to be associated generally with the mark for a dissimilar prod-
uct circulating elsewhere. '229 Thus, the court determined that LEXIS
had no distinctive quality that LEXUS would dilute because the gen-
eral public did not recognize or associate the LEXIS mark with any-
thing else.230 Even though the parties were operating in two separate
markets, there was no danger of dilution because the general public
was not familiar with the LEXIS mark.231 Therefore, LEXIS was not
entitled to state dilution protection because it was neither distinctive
nor famous to the general public.232
The concurring opinion of Judge Sweet is significant in the evolu-
tion of dilution jurisprudence. 233 The core objection of the concur-
rence to the majority's approach was that it limited dilution protection
to nationally famous marks because a strong mark capable of dilution
is a threshold requirement that must be satisfied to state a claim for
dilution.2 34 If the fame requirement is analyzed under the General
Public Theory, then the FTDA will "afford protection only to the
most notorious of all marks. '235 The concurrence argued that if a
trademark has a strong selling power among its "consuming public,"
its lack of selling power for the "non-consuming public" should not
result in a denial of dilution relief.2 36 In response to the belief that
FTDA protection should extend beyond the most famous marks, the
concurring judge articulated a test for courts to use to ascertain when
dilution by blurring has occurred. 237
228. Id. at 1028 (emphasis in original).
229. Id. at 1031.
230. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031. The distinctiveness "LEXIS possesses is limited to the
narrow market of attorneys and accountants. Moreover, the process which LEXIS represents is
widely disparate from the product represented by LEXUS. For the general public, LEXIS has
no distinctive quality that LEXUS will dilute." Id.
231. Id. at 1028.
232. Id. at 1031.
233. Id. at 1033 (Sweet, J., concurring).
234. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1033.
235. Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
236. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1033 (Sweet, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 1035. The "Sweet Factors" for dilution by blurring are as follows: (1) similarity of
the mark; (2) similarity of the products covered by the marks; (3) sophistication of consumers;
(4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of the junior mark. Id.
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2. I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co. 238
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was the
first to cast its vote on the side of the General Public Theory subse-
quent to enactment of the FTDA in I.P. Lund v. Kohler Co. 239 The
trade dress at issue concerned plaintiff's VOLA water faucet versus
defendant's FALLING WATER FAUCET.240  I.P. Lund manufac-
tured bathroom and kitchen fixtures and accessories, including fau-
cets.241 Kohler was the largest supplier of plumbing fixtures in the
country at that time.242 I.P. Lund sought to protect its VOLA faucet
that was designed by a noted architect and had been displayed nation-
ally in magazines after receiving numerous awards. 243 The evidence
suggested that Kohler modeled its faucet after the plaintiff's faucet
with some identifiable differences. 244
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
denied the plaintiff's infringement claim but granted a preliminary in-
junction based on the likelihood of success on the FTDA claim.245
Defendant Kohler Company appealed the decision prohibiting them
from selling their FALLING WATER FAUCET.246 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision with respect to the infringement claim but re-
versed the dilution claim, finding that the trade dress at issue did not
possess the requisite degree of fame necessary under the FTDA.
247
The court relied on legislative history for the following proposition:
Archetypal problems [of dilution] involve non-competing products
as to which there could, by definition, be no confusion and a world-
famous brand name which was either tarnished or blurred by its
application to a different product which was obviously trading on
the good will of that name.248
238. 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 32.
241. IP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 34.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 34. The dissimilarities found by the district court included the "faucets' handles, a
rounded lever . . . compared to a flat lever . . . and a rounded bonnet compared . . . to no
bonnet." Id. The court also held that the "housemarks, "VOLA" and "KOHLER," are clearly
dissimilar and are prominently displayed on the faucets." Id.
245. See I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 112, 127 (D. Mass. 1998).
246. See IP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 32.
247. Id. at 51.
248. Id. at 45 (relying on 141 CONG. REC. S19306, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Orrin Hatch)).
2002] 1189
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The reference to a "world-famous" brand name implies that a trade-
mark must be famous to the general public before it should be entitled
to FTDA protection. Furthermore, the Trademark Review Commis-
sion stated that "the showing of fame required employment of a
'higher standard' than fame among an 'appreciable number of per-
sons' in order to be 'eligible for this extraordinary remedy."' 249 Rely-
ing on this reasoning, the First Circuit rejected the district court's
finding that fame within a niche market was sufficient to state a claim
under the FTDA. "[N]ational renown is an important factor in deter-
mining whether a mark qualifies as famous under the FTDA. ''250 Al-
though "in the world of interior design and high-end bathroom
fixtures, the VOLA is renowned, and [it] has been featured and adver-
tised in national magazines and displayed in museums," the plaintiff
failed to meet the "rigorous standard for fame" under the FTDA.251
Essentially, the First Circuit was only willing to offer FTDA protec-
tion to trademarks that qualify as "supermarks," 252 such as COCA-
COLA.2 53 The implication in I.P. Lund is that a trademark will only
be able to meet this high burden of proof by attaining national or
international renown, and therefore being famous to the general pub-
lic.25 4 By limiting relief to that elite category of marks, the First Cir-
cuit was assuring that the extraordinary remedy provided by the
FTDA was limited so as to maintain the distinction between infringe-
ment and dilution theories.255 In other words, "[d]ilution laws are in-
tended to address specific harms; they are not intended to serve as a
mere fallback protection for trademark owners unable to prove trade-
mark infringement. '256
249. 1.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 46 (quoting The United States Trademark Association Trademark
Review Commission Report, 77 TRADEMARK REPORTER 461).
250. Id. at 47.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 46 (quoting GILSON, supra note 193, at §5.12[a]).
253. IP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 47. "Although some marks such as COCA-COLA, may be so
famous as to be judicially noticed .... the VOLA faucet is far from being a candidate for such
judicial notice." Id.
254. Id. at 46. "A mark that evokes an association with a specific source only when used in
connection with the particular goods or services that it identifies is ordinarily not sufficiently
distinctive to be protected against dilution." Id.
255. Id. at 46. "The Trademark Review Commission noted that the showing of fame required
employment of a 'higher standard' than fame among an 'appreciable number of persons' in or-
der to be 'eligible for this extraordinary remedy."' Id.
256. Id. at 48.
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3. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton 257
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied a
similarly restrictive version of the fame requirement in Avery Denni-
son Corp. v. Sumpton.258 Avery owned registered trademarks for AV-
ERY and DENNISON for office supplies and industrial fasteners. 259
The AVERY mark was in continuous use since the 1930s and the
DENNISON mark was in use since the late 1800s. 2 60 Sumpton, the
president of Mailbank, was an Internet e-mail provider 261 who
charged users a fee to obtain a "vanity e-mail" address and then regis-
tered the domain names for its customers. 262 The plaintiff initiated its
federal dilution claim when defendant registered the domain names
AVERY.NET and DENNISON.NET. 263 Avery markets its products
on the Internet and has registered the domain names AVERY.COM
and AVERYDENNISON.COM. 264
The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held that Sumpton's maintenance of the registrations for the do-
main names at issue diluted Avery's corresponding trademarks. 265
The lower court relied on the fact that both AVERY and DENNISON
had acquired distinctiveness for the relevant market of purchasers of
office supplies. 266 Consequently, Sumpton was ordered to transfer the
domain name registrations to Avery Dennison in exchange for $300
each. 267
The Ninth Circuit rejected proof of the trademarks' distinctiveness
within the office supply market as sufficient to establish fame, stating
that "[i]f all marks are distinctive, and a showing of distinctiveness
meets the element of fame, what marks would be outside the protec-
tion of the FTDA? ' '268 The court strictly interpreted the fame re-
quirement and held that even though four of the eight statutory
factors were met, the plaintiff failed to show the requisite degree of
257. 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 873. "AVERY" has been registered since since 1963 and "DENNISON" has been
registered since 1908. Id.
260. Id.
261. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 872.
262. Id. Users must pay an initial fee of $19.95 and then $4.95 for each year of continued use
of the service. Id.
263. Id. The court noted that most domain names are common surnames, hobbies, careers,
pets, sports interests, favorite music, or business related names. Id. at 872.
264. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 872.
265. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
266. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 871.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 876.
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fame for FTDA protection. 269 Avery failed to meet its burden of
proof because although "fame in a 'specialized market segment' might
be adequate if the 'diluting uses are directed narrowly at the same
market segment... [,]' Avery provided no evidence of customer over-
lap or that defendant's customers possessed any degree of recognition
of plaintiff's marks. '270 In addition, the Ninth Circuit felt widespread
third party use of the names AVERY and DENNISON mitigated
against finding that plaintiff's marks were famous under the FTDA.271
The Ninth Circuit justified its strict scrutiny of the fame require-
ment by reiterating the role of the fame requirement in reinstating the
balance in the Lanham Act to avoid over-protecting trademarks. 272
This case illustrates a classic dilution scenario because the parties'
marks were placed on non-competing goods in unrelated markets,
namely the office supply market and the e-mail market. 273 The Ninth
Circuit found the plaintiff's marks were not famous despite their ac-
quired secondary meaning and distinctiveness in the niche market of
office supplies.274 Avery failed to show that its trademark possessed
any degree of recognition among e-mail users or that Sumpton di-
rected its e-mail services at Avery's customer base.275 In order to
avoid granting "rights in gross" in a trademark, the Ninth Circuit held
that the plaintiff must prove something more than inherent or ac-
quired distinctiveness. 276
4. Michael Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enterprises, Inc.2 77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ex-
pressed its approval of the General Public Theory for fame by af-
firming the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida's decision in Michael Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enter-
269. For the statutory fame factors, see supra note 116.
270. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 877-78.
271. Id. at 878.
272. Id. at 875.
273. Id. at 878. "[Sumpton's] sought-after customer base is Internet users who desire vanity e-
mail addresses, and Avery Dennison's customer base includes purchasers of office products and
industrial fasteners." Id.
274. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 876-77:
Applying the famousness factors from the [FrDA] to the facts of the case at bench, we
conclude that Avery Dennison likely establishes acquired distinctiveness in the "Avery"
and "Dennison" trademarks but goes no further. Because the [FTDA] requires a show-
ing greater than distinctiveness to meet the threshold requirement of fame, as a matter
of law Avery Dennison has failed to fulfill this burden.
Id.
275. Id. at 878.
276. Id. at 875.
277. 994 F. Supp. 1454 (S.D. Fl. 1998), affd, 166 F.3d 353 (11th Cir. 1998).
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prises, Inc. 278 In the Caruso case, the trademarks at issue were
BONGO for junior girls' clothing and BONGO'S CUBAN CAFI, a
restaurant and souvenir shop at Walt Disney World.279 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction based on a failure to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. 280 Sub-
sequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision
and denied any relief based on a federal dilution action.281
The district court rejected the plaintiff's dilution claim because even
though BONGO may have been inherently distinctive in the market
of juniors' clothing, it did not rise to the level of fame engendered by
trademarks such as BUICK or DUPONT. 28 2 The parties' marks were
operating in completely separate markets; therefore, unless the plain-
tiff's mark was proven to be generally famous, there was no danger of
dilution by blurring.283 The lower court implicitly adopted the re-
quirement that fame must be present within the general public to re-
ceive federal dilution protection: 284 "Even if a mark is distinctive in
its particular market, it does not render it inherently distinctive so as
to engender immediate recognition in the general public of a particu-
lar product. '2 85 Although BONGO may be a distinctive trademark
for the junior clothing market, it is not so famous that a similar mark
used in the tourist market would cause dilution of its
distinctiveness. 286
278. See Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463.
279. Id. at 1457.
280. Id. at 1465.
281. Caruso, 166 F.3d at 353. The Eleventh Circuit has not squarely confronted the issue of
whether fame within a niche market is sufficient for protection under the FTDA. Its affirmation
of this case may suggest the court's tendency to be leaning in the direction of adopting the
General Public Theory for fame under the FTDA in the near future.
282. Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463. See also Golden Bear Intern, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969
F. Supp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (denying dilution relief based on lack of fame because al-
though the "Golden Bear" mark is distinctive in a particular market, it "certainly does not rise to
the level of marks such as Exxon, Kodak, and Coca-Cola which have been found to be generally
famous").
283. Id. at 1463-4. See Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1261,
1267 (S.D. Fl. 1999) (requiring fame among the general public for dilution protection where
parties are operating in the unrelated contexts of the "vacation market" and the "day-cruise
market").
284. Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463 (holding that "[t]he Court finds that plaintiff's mark is not
so inherently distinctive and famous as to rise to the level of "Buick" or "DuPont").
285. Id. (quoting King of the Mountain Sports, 968 F. Supp. at 578).
286. Id. at 1464. "Because plaintiff's mark is not famous and dilution is not likely to occur,
plaintiff is not substantially likely to succeed on the merits of its federal trade dilution claim."
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Niche Market Theory and General Public Theory have each
garnered their respective advocates and critics. While it is not yet ap-
parent which one will emerge as the dominant approach, it is clear
that the decision rests on the interpretation of the fame requirement
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), because "[w]ithout
such a requirement, an anti-dilution statute becomes a rogue law that
turns every trademark, no matter how weak, into an anti-competitive
weapon." 287
A. Arguments in Favor of the Niche Market Theory
Proponents of the Niche Market Theory claim that it is based on the
FTDA's fame factor (f),288 which states that fame may be found within
the "trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark's owner
and the person against whom the injunction is sought. ' 2 9 Therefore,
if two parties are competing in the same or related markets, renown
within that specialized market will be enough to satisfy factor (f) and
may be indicative of fame, thus satisfying the FTDA's statutory crite-
ria. 290 The theory only works, however, when the parties are compet-
ing in the same or closely related markets; otherwise, fame on a
substantially broader basis is necessary for dilution to occur.291 There
are a few plausible arguments in favor of accepting fame as defined by
the Niche Market Theory.
1. The Niche Market Theory Provides a Framework for Applying
the FTDA
The language of the FTDA is admittedly vague and offers only a
skeleton of how Congress viewed the cause of action. 292 Moreover,
287. MCCAR1rHY, supra note 15, at § 24:108, 24-210. See generally Milton W. Handler, "Are
the State Anti-dilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?" 75
TRADEMARK REP. 269, 280 (1985).
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
289. Id. While some advocates thought factor (d) provided additional support for the theory,
the Seventh Circuit clearly rejected the idea that fame within a geographical or local market
satisfied the FFDA's requirement. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 641 n.7 ("Congress intended that
in order to be 'famous,' a mark must be used in a substantial segment of the United States.").
See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:112 ("The [niche theory of relative strength] cannot be
applied territorially to the [FFDA], which requires substantially nationwide fame.").
29). See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:112 ("[A] mark should not be categorized as 'fa-
mous' unless it is known to more than 50 percent of the defendant's potential customers.").
291. See Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 640 (limiting use of the Niche Market Theory to the
context where plaintiff and defendant are using the mark in the same or related markets).
292. See Reichman, supra note 11, at 111 n.3. See Sally Gee, 699 F.2d at 625 (noting that
judges find dilution "a somewhat nebulous concept"); Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1034 (finding that
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judges have struggled with dilution because there is little direction,
beyond the list of fame factors and the general definitions in the Lan-
ham Act, for applying the ETDA. 293 The Niche Market Theory pro-
poses a method for determining fame that is relatively easy to apply,
despite the fact that it relies solely on a judge's discretion. To deter-
mine whether a trademark is famous, the judge must look at the mar-
ket in which each party is competing.294 If the parties are competing
in the same market, then the court may rely on evidence, such as con-
sumer surveys, that demonstrates whether the mark is famous within
the boundaries of that specialized market. 295 If the parties are com-
peting in unrelated markets, the plaintiff must provide evidence of
fame on a more substantial basis, showing national or even global re-
nown of his mark. Therefore, the crux of a dilution inquiry under the
Niche Market Theory is defining the market in which fame must
appear. 296
2. The Niche Market Theory Protects the Owner's Investment in
His Trademark
The Niche Market Theory also provides protection for the owner's
proprietary interest and offers incentives for developing the fame of a
mark. 297 Many people remain uncomfortable with the idea of protect-
ing the value of a trademark rather than its signaling capacity to avoid
consumer confusion.298 However, the FTDA is federal law, and it re-
quires courts, to a limited extent, to protect the owner's property
"application requires navigation of the 'murky waters' of the dilution doctrine"); and Ringling
Bros., 170 F.3d at 449.
293. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) ("In determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to...") (emphasis added). The
statutory language explicitly states that while courts may consider the factors to analyze fame
they are not bound or limited by the factors and may consider any evidence of fame that is found
to be relevant by the court.
294. For Judge Barry's discussion of the market in which fame must exist, see supra notes 191-
209 and accompanying text. See also Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 174 ("It is possible to find virtu-
ally any mark to be 'famous' within some market, depending on how narrowly that market is
defined.").
295. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:112 ("[A] mark should not be catego-
rized as 'famous' unless it is known to more than 50 percent of the defendant's potential
customers.").
296. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. e. The Restatement offered support for the
Niche Market Theory: "A mark that is highly distinctive only to a select class or group of pur-
chasers may be protected from diluting uses directed at that particular class or group. For exam-
ple, a mark may be highly distinctive among purchasers of a specific type of product." Id.
297. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (stating that "[tihe concept of dilution recognizes the
substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of
the mark itself").
298. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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rights in the selling value of his trademark.299 Ideally, courts should
strive to offer enough incentive in the form of protection for famous
marks to reward the owner's investment and ensure fair competition,
while not providing so much protection that free competition or free
expression is stifled. 300 Because it safeguards the owner's property
rights, the Niche Market Theory is consistent with dilution theory.
3. The Niche Market Theory Provides a Secondary Benefit to
Consumers
It may also be argued that the consumer receives an indirect benefit
from the development of a famous trademark. In order to become
famous, the mark owner must expend substantial time and money in
educating the public about his product and ensuring that its quality is
consistent to encourage consumers to engage in repeat purchases.301
The consumer benefits because the product represented by the fa-
mous trademark is likely to be of a consistently high quality in order
to stimulate future purchases by the same consumer.30 2 Conse-
quently, even though dilution is primarily aimed at protecting the
owner's proprietary interest in his investment, a mark's fame provides
a secondary benefit to the consumer in the form of high quality goods
and services.
4. The FTDA Does Not Limit Protection to Non-Competing Goods
or Services
Although the FTDA does not require a likelihood of confusion, it
also does not preclude dilution protection when the goods are com-
peting in the same market. 30 3 In Nabisco v. PF Brands, the Second
Circuit acknowledged that dilution may occur when the parties are
299. See generally Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 449.
300. See generally Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993). See
also WIPO, PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION: ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT WORLD
SITUATION (1994); RESTATEMENi, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. b. "Some courts, and numerous
commentators, [have] expressed fear that the uncertain limits of the anti-dilution cause of action
would unduly expand the ability of trademark owners to monopolize language and inhibit free
competition." Id.
301. See generally, Swann, supra note 43, at 758:
One of the benefits of a strong mark-and an aspect of its value-is the owner's well
earned capacity to achieve a high degree of consumer recognition (and response) with
less costly forms of advertising than had been necessary to establish the mark's strength
[or to get 'dramatically more impact' from the same 'communications budget'].
Id. (quoting Dreyfus Fund, 525 F. Supp. at 1115).
302. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The statutory language does not limit FTDA protection to
trademarks in competition within the same market.
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competing in the same market or in different markets.30 4 In order for
infringement to occur, consumers must be confused as to the source or
sponsorship of goods or services. 30 5 If consumer confusion is present,
the plaintiff may bring an action for infringement of the goodwill of
his trademark. 30 6
As previously discussed, the mental state required for dilution is
typically inconsistent with that of consumer confusion. 30 7 In a dilution
case, a consumer is not confused as to the source or sponsorship of the
trademark. Indeed, the public instinctively associates the junior use
with the senior's mark, and consequently, the uniqueness of the se-
nior's mark as a selling agent for its products is diminished.30 8 There-
fore, it is possible, especially if the specialized market is narrowly
defined, that although some consumers within the niche are confused,
others are not confused but associate the defendant's mark with the
plaintiff's mark.30 9 In Nabisco, the Second Circuit recognized that
"the closer the products are to one another, the greater the likelihood
of both confusion and dilution. ' '3t0 Therefore, the Niche Market The-
ory may be appropriate when parties are competing in the same mar-
ket, and most courts that have adopted the theory have confined its
use to this context. 311
However, criticism leveled at the Niche Market Theory centers
around judicial reluctance to fully address the fame requirement and
reliance on the likelihood of confusion standard to provide relief
under the FTDA.312 Many courts are merely paying lip service to the
explicit requirements of the FIFDA statute and continue to address the
issue of consumer confusion despite the intentional congressional
omission of a confusion requirement in the statutory language. For
304. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 222. "[D]ilution can occur where the junior mark's use com-
petes directly with the senior's as well as where the junior use is in a non-competing market." Id.
305. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
306. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
307. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:70 (stating that the "connection is not the kind of
mental link between the parties that triggers the classic likelihood of confusion text").
308. Id.
309. Id. McCarthy suggests that it is possible for dilution and infringement to occur simulta-
neously in the consuming public even though each requires a separate mental state. Id.
310. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 222.
311. See Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 640-641 ("On remand, the district court should consider
whether, in the market as we have defined it in the case, Syndicate Sales' trade dress is suffi-
ciently famous."); Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173 ("The niche market theory risks lowering the
bar for trademark protection unless it is applied prudently to cases which clearly call for such
analysis.").
312. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 172 (Barry, J., dissenting). "Unless courts strictly adhere to
the admittedly vague dictates of the [FrDA], federal dilution protection will surely give rise to a
broad regime of trademark rights in gross." Id.
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example, in Nabisco, the Second Circuit explained that consumer con-
fusion is not a requirement for finding dilution but went on to state
that "consumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the distinctive
selling power of the mark." 3 13 The court's finding that dilution may
occur on competing and non-competing goods bolsters the argument
that the Niche Market Theory is a way for courts to continue to apply
the consumer confusion analysis, albeit in disguise.
5. The Niche Market Theory Broadens the Scope of Protection for
Trademarks
Finally, the Niche Market Theory is beneficial to trademark owners
because it broadens the scope of protection under the FTDA. The
legislative history points out that "courts should be discerning and se-
lective in dubbing a mark 'famous' so as to qualify for protection
against dilution."' 314 However, if the legislative intent is applied liter-
ally, dilution protection will only be bestowed upon an elite class of
"supermarks. '3 15 The concurring opinion in Mead Data criticized
such a literal interpretation of the fame requirement because then
FTDA protection would be confined "only to the most notorious of all
marks. ' 31 6 In a pre-FTDA examination of trademarks capable of di-
lution, the concurring judge argued for a wider range of protection; if
a trademark has a strong selling power among its "consuming public,"
its lack of selling power for the "non-consuming public" should not
result in a denial of dilution relief.317 Presumably, the "consuming
public" language suggests that marks that are well known within their
niche market are famous enough for purposes of federal dilution
protection.
It is irrefutable that Congress did not intend for every trademark to
be eligible for protection under the FTDA.318 However, it is also
questionable whether Congress would reserve dilution protection for
an extremely elite class of supermarks. It is hard to believe that any-
thing would undermine the selling power of trademark giants such as
313. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219. The court went on to say that "[a] junior use that confuses
consumers as to which mark is which surely dilutes the distinctiveness of the senior mark." Id.
314. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:109, 24-212 (examining the legislative history to deter-
mine how strong a mark must be to deserve dilution protection).
315. See supra notes 238-256 (discussing I.P. Lund, in which the First Circuit confined its
definition of fame to those trademarks or "supermarks" famous enough to be recognized by the
general public).
316. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1033 (Sweet, J., concurring).
317. Id.
318. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15 at § 24:109 (discussing the legislative history of the
FTDA). See also H.R. REi,. No. 104-374 at 3-4.
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COCA-COLA and BUDWEISER. To return to the case discussed in
the introduction to this Comment, it is unlikely that a small, non-
profit, floral organization's use of THIS BUD'S FOR YOU would se-
riously undermine the selling power of Anheuser-Busch's trade-
mark.319 The extensive time and money spent on advertising to attain
the fame of supermarks seems to cut against any diminution in the
selling power of the marks. Consequently, owners of such supermarks
may not need the extra protection dilution offers.
It is plausible that Congress intended the FTDA to apply to more
than the trademark giants and that offering protection to marks that
are famous within a niche market is consistent with the idea of pro-
tecting the proprietary interest of the trademark owner. Indeed, it is
the small and medium-sized business owners that will likely be
harmed by the diminution in the selling power of their marks from an
unauthorized use. Therefore, it seems within the spirit of the FTDA
to award protection against the dilution of a mark, even if it is only
famous within a specialized niche.
B. Arguments in Favor of the General Public Theory
There are also compelling arguments for rejecting the Niche Market
Theory and adopting the General Public Theory as the standard for
identifying famous marks for federal dilution protection. The argu-
ments for general public fame center around congressional intent and
avoiding the creation of exclusive property rights in gross for the
trademark owner. This Comment advocates rejection of the Niche
Market Theory because it amounts to a likelihood of confusion analy-
sis in disguise and, in turn, creates perpetual monopolies for owners of
famous trademarks.
1. The Niche Market Theory is Inconsistent with Congressional
Intent
One reason for rejecting the Niche Market Theory is that it is
clearly at odds with the congressional intent underlying the purpose of
the FTDA.320 In Professor Schechter's initial articulation of dilution,
he described brands that were "nationally famous among consumers
generally. ' 321 Based largely upon Schechter's ideas, Congress created
the federal dilution statute to be a "highly selective federal cause of
action," reserved for a "limited category of trademarks ... which are
319. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
320. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-374.
321. See Swann, supra note 43, at 741 (articulating Schechter's construction of dilution
theory).
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.. truly famous and ... deserving of national protection from dilu-
tion. '322 Congress noted that "[a] federal dilution statute is necessary
because famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis. '32 3
Furthermore, the examples of famous trademarks set forth in the
Congressional record include DUPONT, BUICK, and KODAK,324 all
of which are marks used on a national, if not global, basis and are,
therefore, famous to the general public. As the First Circuit noted in
I.P. Lund, the FTDA was intended to address dilution of "world fa-
mous brand name[s] which [were] either tarnished or blurred by
[their] application to a different product. ' 325 If a trademark is a world
famous brand name, it must be "truly famous" for a "substantial por-
tion" of consumers in the United States.326
It is contradictory to say that a trademark recognized within a single
niche market is "truly famous" to a "substantial portion" of the
United States. By its definition, the Niche Market Theory concedes
that a mark is not famous to the general public and is only recognized
by a limited group of consumers. 32 7 For example, the Second Circuit
refused to find Mead Data's LEXIS trademark famous enough to be
diluted because "only one percent of the general population associates
LEXIS with the attributes of Mead's service, [and therefore] it cannot
be said that LEXIS identifies that service to the general public. ' 328
Thus, establishing recognition of a trademark within a niche market
falls well below the high burden of proof placed on a plaintiff seeking
protection under the FTDA.329
322. USTA Report, supra note 12, at 455.
323. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3.
324. Id.
325. I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 45 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch) (emphasis added)).
326. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7.
327. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 157. In its acceptance of the Niche Market Theory, the
Third Circuit stated, "We are not persuaded that a mark not famous to the general public is
nevertheless entitled to protection from dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are op-
erating in the same or related markets, so long as the plaintiff's mark possesses a high degree of
fame in its niche market." Id. at 164.
328. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031. The Second Circuit found that Mead Data was not
entitled to relief because its trademark was not diluted under the requirements of New York's
anti-dilution statute. Id. at 1032.
329. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. e:
Not all trademarks warrant protection against a dilution of the mark's distinctiveness.
In applying the anti-dilution statutes, most courts require that the mark possess a de-
gree of distinctiveness beyond that needed for the designation to qualify as a valid
trademark. As a general matter, a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by
a nonconfusing use if the mark retains its source significance when encountered outside
the context of goods or services with which the mark is used by the trademark owner.
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In addition to a congressional intent to create a highly selective
cause of action, neither the language of the FTDA nor the legislative
history contemplate fame in a market smaller than the general pub-
lic. 330 Dilution was intended to be used in a highly discriminatory
fashion to preserve the distinction between traditional infringement
law and dilution law.33' The language of the FTDA does not provide
a factor indicating the requisite fame if there is "fame within in a niche
or specialized market. ' 332 Therefore, the only conclusion that can be
drawn from these significant omissions is that Congress intended for
the courts to restrict federal dilution relief to the heavyweights of
trademark practice, which are those supermarks that are essentially
household names to the general public.333 Anything less than fame
within the general public does not clear the high hurdle contemplated
in the legislative history; therefore, the Niche Market Theory is in-
compatible with the purposes underlying the FTDA.
2. The Niche Market Theory Poses a Problem in Defining a Market
for Fame
A related problem with the premise of the Niche Market Theory is
that judges must define the boundaries of the specialized market
before they can determine whether the plaintiff's mark is famous
within it. Due to the fact that the FTDA does not incorporate a niche
market analysis into its language, judges applying the theory are left
without guidance as to how the specialized market should be de-
fined. 334 Therefore, the central tenet of the FTDA analysis is entirely
within the judge's discretion; a determination of how narrowly or
broadly the market is defined must proceed on an ad hoc basis with-
330. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173. "For starters the legislative history does not mention
much less embrace a so-called 'niche market' theory of fame." Id. The only reference to a Niche
Market Theory comes from the Trademark Review Commission. "[I]f a mark is famous at the
industrial level but not at the consumer level, protection may be appropriate at the industrial
level but not at the consumer level." Id. at 173 n.3 (quoting USTA Report, supra note 12, at
461).
331. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 171. "[T]he legislative history amply supports the conclu-
sion that the FTDA should be restricted to a narrow category of marks, ensuring that it does not
swallow infringement law by allowing mark owners to end-run a likelihood of confusion analysis
which they fear-or indeed, know-they cannot win." Id.
332. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
333. See IP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 46. In its effort to provide a definition of famous trademarks,
the First Circuit described such marks as "very unique marks" (quoting S. REP. No. 100-515, at
41-42); "Supermarks" (quoting GILSON, supra note 192, at § 5.12[1][a]); and marks that require
"a higher standard than fame among an appreciable number of persons in order to be eligible for
this extraordinary remedy." Id.
334. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. e. The restatement only refers to a spe-
cialized market in terms of a "select class or group of purchasers." Id.
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out any support in the statutory language.335 The dissent in Times
Mirror criticized the notion of allowing judges free rein to define the
specialized market as an insurmountable hurdle to applying the Niche
Market Theory. The dissent argued that the "fundamental problem
with the majority's application of the [N]iche [M]arket [T]heory ... is
that is hard to conceive of any consumer goods or services that are not
in a narrow market of some type, be it luxury cars, cameras or sport-
ing publications. ' 336 Essentially, any trademark can be famous de-
pending on how narrowly the market is defined. 337 This clearly poses
a problem for limiting the class of elite marks eligible for protection
under the FTDA and is consequently inconsistent with congressional
intent. Because the Niche Market Theory requires courts to define
the boundaries of the specialized market and requires judicial manipu-
lation of the fame requirement, it should be rejected as a means for
analyzing claims under the FTDA.
3. The Niche Market Theory Threatens Free Competition
Trademark law is designed to maintain the delicate balance between
free competition and fair competition. 338 Prior to the enactment of
dilution statutes, an owner could only protect the signaling capacity of
his trademark, thereby preserving its goodwill and preventing con-
sumer confusion, deception, and mistake. 339 In contrast, dilution rec-
ognizes the inherent value in a trademark as a selling agent for the
owner's products and, therefore, protects the proprietary investment
in a mark. 340 While the idea of trademarks as lucrative business assets
may accurately reflect their function in a modern economy, "this type
335. Id. The Restatement suggests a limit to the judge's discretion by stating that if a trade-
mark has obtained fame within a niche, "protection against dilution of the mark's distinctiveness
is ordinarily appropriate only against uses specifically directed at that particular class of purchas-
ers." Id.
336. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173 (Barry, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 174 ("It is possible to find virtually any mark to be 'famous' within some market,
depending on how narrowly that market is defined.").
338. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999);
William Marroletti, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear International Stan-
dard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK J. INT'L L. 659 (1999); and Daniel M. Mc-
Clure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 28-33
(1996).
339. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
340. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)
(noting that "[a] trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants"). See generally Ringling Bros., 170
F.3d at 449 (recognizing the owner's proprietary interest in his trademark); see also S. REP. No.
1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (describing the dual purposes of trade-
mark law as consumer protection and safeguarding the owner's investment in a mark from mis-
appropriation by others).
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of approach runs contrary to the historical purposes of trademark law
that recognizes [sic] the need in every case to weigh the rights of the
plaintiff against those of the defendant. ' 341 However, the FTDA is
not designed to weigh the relative interests between free and fair com-
petition. Its sole purpose is to reward and preserve the uniqueness
and, therefore, the selling capacity of famous trademarks. 342 This is
dangerous for the traditional scheme of intellectual property protec-
tion because, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Avery Dennison, dilution
threatens to "upset the balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks
at the expense of non-infringing uses. ' 343 If fame is only proven to
exist within a niche market, the danger of the mark having anticompe-
titive effects is significantly increased. 344 Consequently, courts must
realize that "[dilution] is a potent legal tool, which must be carefully
used as a scalpel, not a sledgehammer. ' 345 If courts heed the warnings
of Congress and apply dilution in a highly selective manner, then the
Niche Market Theory should be abandoned as an unnecessary and
unreasonable danger to free and fair competition.
4. The Niche Market Theory Creates Exclusive Rights in Gross for
Trademarks
Many critics of the Niche Market Theory have cited the "extraordi-
nary remedy" the FFDA provides as one of their main concerns.346
As initially conceived by Schechter, "there is no property in a trade-
mark apart from the business or trade in connection with which it is
employed. ' 347 The danger in recognizing and protecting the proprie-
tary interest in an owner's mark is the creation of exclusive rights in
gross. 348 Upon federal registration of a trademark, the owner receives
the right to use the mark to sell his products without interference from
341. See Handler, supra note 287, at 282.
342. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 449. The Fourth Circuit's restrictive interpretation of the
FTDA requirements includes "an actual lessening of the mark's selling power, expressed as 'its
capacity to identify and distinguish goods or services."' Id. at 458.
343. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875.
344. See generally Ablin & Koshy, supra note 9, at 69. "Judicial reaction was hostile. Dilution
represented a very powerful weapon with which to protect trademark rights. Courts feared that
dilution rights might effectively give trademark owners monopolies in their marks, a concept
that was inconsistent with the country's strong preference for a competitive, market-based econ-
omy." Id.
345. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:114.
346. The Fourth Circuit addressed this concern in Ringling Bros. and held that a plaintiff must
prove actual dilution of its famous mark in order to avoid "improperly creating property rights in
gross for famous marks." See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 449.
347. See Schechter, supra note 43, at 822 (quoting American Steel Foundries, 269 U.S. at 380).
348. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875 ("Dilution causes of action, much more so than
unfair competition laws, tread very close to granting 'rights in gross' in a trademark.").
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confusingly similar marks. 349 Dilution under the FTDA expands those
rights to allow the owner of a famous trademark to enjoin use of his
mark, even if the use occurs on non-competing goods in an unrelated
market where no confusion is likely to occur.350
Consequently, the creation of a federal dilution cause of action al-
lows successful plaintiffs to receive nationwide protection from dilu-
tion of their famous marks.351 Because all remedies under the FTDA
are subject to the discretion of the judge according to the principles of
equity,3 52 there is a danger that the scope of the relief may exceed the
scope of the trademark's fame if the Niche Market Theory is used.353
This is because an injunction may apply to the general public, even
though fame only exists in a narrowly defined niche market. The dis-
sent in Times Mirror suggested that the real danger of the Niche Mar-
ket Theory was the extensive relief authorized by the FTDA.35 4
Essentially, the owner of a famous trademark may enjoin any other
use of his mark. 355 Taken to its logical extreme, it is within a court's
discretion to issue a blanket injunction for all unauthorized use in any
context, even if the plaintiff is only able to prove fame within a nar-
rowly defined niche market. 356 While principles of equity seem to dis-
favor this result, it is technically possible under the current statutory
language. "It may just be a matter of time before dilution eclipses
confusion as the gravamen of most federal trademark actions and
trademark rights in gross displace consumer confusion as the defining
feature of United States Trademark law. '357 Therefore, the Niche
Market Theory should be rejected because it has the potential to cre-
ate exclusive rights in gross for trademarks.
349. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
351. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 104-374.
352. See 15 U.S.C §§ 1117(a) and 1118.
353. But see RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 25 cmt. E.
354. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 170 (Barry, J., dissenting).
355. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 174. "The extensive relief the FTDA authorizes, which
gives the owner of the famous mark a virtual monopoly by precluding all others from using the
mark 'regardless of the presence or absence of. . .competition between the owner of the famous
mark and other parties, or likelihood of confusion,' is itself something federal trademark law had
not before seen, and surely was not meant to be accorded to any marginally 'famous' mark." Id.
356. See generally Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 39. Although this case was decided on the basis of
New York's anti-dilution statute, it provides a useful analogy. There the Second Circuit held
that it was within the district court's discretion to grant a nationwide injunction for a state trade-
mark dilution claim. Id. at 41. Although the district court limited injunctive relief to the state of
New York, the Second Circuit recognized the lower court's power to grant broad injunctive
relief. Id.
357. See Robert N. Kleiger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 789, 847-48 (1997).
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5. The Niche Market Theory is a Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
in Disguise
The classic dilution case under the FTDA exists when a famous
trademark is placed on dissimilar, non-competing goods or services,
thereby diminishing the uniqueness and selling power of the senior
user's trademark.35 8 The dissenting opinion in Times Mirror suc-
cinctly stated the scenario envisioned by Congress:
Congress was quite clear, however, that the FTDA was not designed
for situations in which ordinary infringement law provided a remedy
but, rather, for those situations in which a truly famous mark on
dissimilar products deserves, but cannot receive, protection under
infringement law-those situations in which, for example, no one
would ever confuse that truly famous mark with the goods or ser-
vices to which it has been wrongly attached.35 9
In contrast, the Niche Market Theory has only been accepted in
those cases where the parties' marks are competing within the same or
a related market. 360 In Syndicate Sales, the Seventh Circuit narrowly
defined the context in which the Niche Market Theory is appropriate:
"Cases stating that niche-market renown is a factor indicating fame
address a context.., in which the plaintiff and defendant are using the
mark in the same or related markets."'361 Therefore, the Niche Mar-
ket Theory is not being used as a means to analyze classic dilution
problems in which the parties' marks are operating in separate mar-
kets on dissimilar goods. Consequently, courts are reverting to an in-
fringement analysis instead of interpreting and applying the F[DA.
Although trademark owners have embraced the FTDA as a power-
ful source of protection, courts are still hesitant to apply the dilution
theory, despite the fact that it is federal law.362 The Niche Market
Theory is a way for judges to conservatively apply the FFDA because
dilution relief will only be granted in those cases that also support a
finding of consumer confusion. As the Second Circuit stated in
Nabisco, "[C]onsumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the dis-
358. See generally Schechter, supra note 43.
359. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 174 (Barry, J., dissenting).
360. For examples of cases where the Niche Market Theory was rejected because the parties
were operating in separate markets, see Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1026; I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 27;
Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 868; and Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1454.
361. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 640. The Seventh Circuit went on further to state that it
offered no opinion whether or not the theory was appropriate in cases where the plaintiff and
defendant were in separate markets. Id. at 640 n.5.
362. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:100 (noting that judges view dilution theory with
distaste because they see plaintiffs as trademark owners asking for too much of a zone of exclu-
sivity for the trademark).
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tinctive selling power of a trademark. '363 What the court fails to rec-
ognize is that consumer confusion is irrelevant to the dilution inquiry.
An analysis of any federal dilution claim should focus on the fame
requirement and the statutory factors of the FTDA, not whether there
is consumer confusion because the parties are operating in the same
market. The Niche Market Theory blurs the issue because it places
the parties' goods in the same market and allows judges to use the
traditional confusion analysis to justify any relief they may award the
plaintiff.
Therefore, in its current application, the Niche Market Theory
amounts to a likelihood of confusion analysis in disguise. The dissent
in Times Mirror used the opinion in Gazette Newspapers as an ex-
treme example of a court that relied solely on its infringement analysis
to award dilution relief.364 After determining that the plaintiff
presented enough evidence to establish that consumer confusion was
likely, the court stated that the FTDA analysis consists "in large part
[of] the same factors [we] have already considered in evaluating plain-
tiff's claim for trademark infringement. '365 Then the court summarily
concluded that the plaintiff was also entitled to dilution relief based
on the infringement analysis without any consideration of the ele-
ments mandated by the FTDA.366 This is another example of how
courts are using the infringement analysis as a substitute for dilution
when the Niche Market Theory would apply.
Another indication that the Niche Market Theory may be nothing
more than a confusion analysis in disguise is the test articulated by the
concurring opinion in Mead Data.367 The factors set forth to analyze
dilution by blurring are suspiciously similar to the Polaroid factors
that form the basis of traditional trademark infringement analysis. 368
Indeed, many courts have rejected the Mead Data factors as inappro-
363. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219. Although the court initially acknowledged the fact that likeli-
hood of confusion in not necessary for dilution, it went on to say that "dilution [could] be found
in circumstances that would also support an action for infringement." Id.
364. For a discussion of Gazette Newspapers, see supra note 197. For a recent case question-
ing the Gazette Newspapers decision, see GreenPoint Fin. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 116
F.Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
365. Gazette Newspapers, 934 F. Supp. at 696.
366. Id. at 697. Most significant is the fact that the court did not consider whether the plain-
tiff's mark satisfied the "famous" requirement.
367. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
368. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. The Polaroid factors for infringement are as follows: (1)
strength of the mark; (2) degree of similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the products; (4)
bridging the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) junior user's good faith in adopting the mark; (7)
quality of the respective goods; and (8) sophistication of the relevant buyers. Id.
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priate for dilution analysis.369 Their criticism stems from the fact that
the test seems to be searching for consumer confusion rather than the
gradual whittling away of a famous trademark.370 This supports the
claim that judges who are applying the Niche Market Theory continue
to use traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, albeit in a backdoor
fashion. Judges seem to feel more comfortable finding dilution when
there is also a case for infringement. Therefore, by confining the
Niche Market Theory to cases where the marks are in competition
with each other, the court has an alternative, but erroneous, justifica-
tion for its decision.
V. IMPACT-FAMOUS TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC
If courts continue to assess federal dilution claims using the Niche
Market Theory, the evil that dilution critics have long predicted will
become reality: dilution theory will overrun trademark law.371 An in-
herent difficulty with the Niche Market Theory stems from the fact
that judges are required to define the specialized market in which the
plaintiff's mark is widely recognized. The idea of defining a fame mar-
ket is omitted from the legislative history and statutory language of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FFDA), neither of which men-
tion narrowing the market to anything less than the total universe of
consumers. Therefore, the real danger of the Niche Market Theory
lies in the potential for judicial manipulation of the dilution doctrine;
"it is possible to find virtually any mark to be 'famous' within some
market, depending on how narrowly that market is defined." 372
Moreover, the malleability of the specialized market significantly
lowers the burden of proof needed to establish a prima facie case
under the FTDA claim. Instead of showing that his mark is "truly
famous," a plaintiff only needs to show that a single group of purchas-
ers can identify his product. This does not even approach the legisla-
tive mandate that the FTDA "creates a highly selective federal cause
of action to protect ... marks that are truly famous from dilution. '373
369. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 463-64 (noting that "the Mead factor analysis simply is not
appropriate for addressing a claim under the federal Act"); IP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49-50;
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 226-27.
370. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:94.2 ("These factors are the offspring of class-
ical likelihood of confusion analysis and are not particularly relevant or helpful in resolving the
issues of dilution by blurring.").
371. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 172. Judge Barry noted, "Unless courts strictly adhere to
the admittedly vague dictates of the federal dilution statute, federal dilution protection will
surely give rise to a broad regime of trademark rights in gross." Id.
372. Id. at 174.
373. Id. at 171 (quoting S. REP. No. 100-515, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604).
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It is, therefore, contrary to the purpose underlying the FTDA to
equate recognition within a niche market to truly famous trademarks.
Furthermore, the Niche Market Theory not only fails to limit pro-
tection to the category of marks envisioned by Congress, it is a com-
pletely unnecessary facet of federal dilution jurisprudence. Because
the theory is only being used in cases where the parties' goods are
competing in the same markets, traditional infringement law is availa-
ble to remedy any harm inflicted on the plaintiff's trademark. This
criticism was supported by the dissent in Times Mirror: "The unau-
thorized use of a mark in the same or a similar market is precisely
what good old-fashioned infringement principles have traditionally
been there to remedy once actual confusion or likelihood of confusion
has been shown, and there is simply no need for dilution
principles. '374
Consequently, if a plaintiff fears the selling power of his mark is
being compromised by a use on competing goods within the same
market, his relief lies in enjoining the defendant's use under infringe-
ment theory.375 Dilution, on the other hand, results in an injury that is
materially different than the harm caused by traditional infringement.
Although consumer confusion is absent, "unauthorized use of a fa-
mous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies
something unique, singular, or particular. '376 The essence of prevent-
ing dilution is to preserve the pizzazz that famous marks have in the
public eye. If, however, the plaintiff's injury is caused by a similar
good, competing in the same market, the relevant cause of action is
for infringement, not dilution.
If federal dilution actions are limited to those supermarks that war-
rant FTDA protection, the fame requirement must be the quintessen-
tial factor of judicial analysis. The courts must rigorously examine and
scrutinize the plaintiff's evidence of fame. Moreover, a trademark
should be considered famous only if it has a notorious and widespread
reputation among consumers. A famous trademark is essentially a
household name, something that all consumers are familiar with even
if they do not purchase the goods bearing the famous trademark. The
relevant market in which fame must exist is the general public, essen-
tially the national or global spectrum of all consumers who are present
in society at any given period of time.
374. Id. at 174.
375. Id. "[lIf the parties here operate within the sporting periodicals market, then this case
. . . is a garden variety infringement case." Id.
376. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4.
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Consequently, only the trademark giants should be able to satisfy
the fame requirement of the FTDA. Because famous trademarks
transcend their source identification function to become virtual cul-
tural icons, the federal courts should not find it difficult to identify
such marks for protection. Trademarks that have achieved fame inun-
date our senses on a daily basis: COCA-COLA, MCDONALDS,
NIKE, and BUDWEISER are examples of trademarks that are fa-
mous to all consumers. They go beyond communicating to the con-
sumer the source of the goods; instead, these marks project an image
that appeals to consumers who consequently choose to purchase the
product based on the status it symbolizes. However, this level of
widespread fame can only be achieved when the mark is famous to
society as a whole, on a national, or even global, basis.
At least one commentator has suggested that the FTDA should be
amended to require that marks be famous to the general public in
order to state a claim for relief.377 This commentator justified the
amendment, stating that "[it] is more relevant to a trademark's fame
that the general public recognizes the mark as referring to a particular
brand of goods or services moving in a specialized market than it is for
persons within that market to recognize the mark. '378 Other com-
mentators have posited bright-line tests that would require an FTDA
plaintiff to establish fame for a percentage of the population through
nationwide consumer surveys.379
This Comment advocates the judicial adoption of a general public
test to identify the class of supermarks that should be eligible for
FTDA protection. Although a uniform definition of fame may not be
feasible, short of an amendment to the FTDA, we should trust that
courts will know famous trademarks when they see them.
380
377. See Becker, supra note 18, at 1460 (proposing, in addition to other statutory amend-
ments, that the current factor (f) in the FTDA be altered to read "the degree to which the
general public recognizes the mark as famous").
378. Id. Becker also rejects fame within in a niche market as sufficient to satisfy fame in the
general public. Id.
379. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:92 (requiring that fifty percent of consumers rec-
ognize plaintiff's mark); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving
Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REv. 201, 234 (1999)
(suggesting recognition by forty percent of consumers nationwide establishes fame).
380. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). Trusting courts to recognize fame even
though they may not be able to agree on its definition is analogous to how the Supreme Court
treats obscenity. The famous quote in Justice Stewart's concurrence succinctly states this idea:
I shall not today attempt to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description [of obscenity]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in
this case is not that.
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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A. The General Public Test
In its analysis of fame, courts should assess and balance a number of
factors to determine the amount of fame achieved by the trademark.
The following are possible factors to measure the mark's fame among
the general public that could be used in conjunction with the existing
statutory factors.
1. Advertising
The rationale underlying the FTDA is to protect the proprietary
interest that the owner has invested in his famous trademark. There-
fore, courts should assess both the quantitative and qualitative adver-
tising efforts that were employed to promote the plaintiff's mark as
indicators of whether the mark is truly famous.381 A quantitative
measure would "evaluate the effect of advertising [by] presum[ing] a
high effectiveness from high sales figures. ' 382 In Avery Dennison, the
Ninth Circuit presumed the effectiveness of marketing from the
amount of annual sales.383 The court determined that the advertising
factor (c) was satisfied because the plaintiff spent substantial sums on
advertising "with some presumable degree of success due to [plain-
tiff's] significant annual volume of sales. '384 Therefore, courts could
compare the plaintiff's advertising expenditures with its annual sales
volume as an indication of fame. For example, if NIKE presented evi-
dence that it spent $1.2 billion dollars in marketing last year and re-
corded net sales of $10 billion dollars, the court could safely presume
the effectiveness of NIKE's advertising and the fame of its trademark.
The advertising factor should also be analyzed in terms of how and
where the goods were promoted. The optimum advertising venue will
expose a large audience to the trademark in a salient fashion. This
qualitative component of the analysis would presume effective mar-
keting results in an increased level of fame for the owner's trade-
mark. 38 5 For example, if Anheuser-Busch runs BUDWEISER
commercials during the Super Bowl, millions of people will see and
probably remember the company's quirky frogs doing crazy things for
beer. It is safe to presume that advertising during the Super Bowl
381. See Becker, supra note 18, at 1458.
382. Id. at 1459.
383. Avery Dennison,189 F.3d at 868.
384. Id. at 878-79.
385. See Becker, supra note 18, at 1459. Becker quotes Gilson for an example of qualitatively
effective advertising. Id. An owner who spent millions of dollars for a commercial during the
Super Bowl would be more effective in raising the level of recognition for his trademark than
someone who spent the same amount of money on rural billboards in the western U.S. Id.
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contributes to the fame of BUDWEISER among the general public
based on the sheer mass of public exposure. After examining both the
quantitative and qualitative advertising components, the court must
determine whether the evidence indicates the mark is famous to the
general realm of consumers.
2. Strength of the Mark
An obvious, but important, consideration of the court's fame analy-
sis concerns the strength of the plaintiff's mark. Trademark law offers
a sliding scale of protection depending on the strength of the mark. 38 6
It is generally presumed that an arbitrary or fanciful mark will be
more effective as a source identifier and, consequently, it is awarded
more protection against infringing uses. 387 Conversely, descriptive
marks must obtain secondary meaning before they are protected
under the Lanham Act.38 8 Courts may presume that an arbitrary or
fanciful mark is more likely to achieve fame than a descriptive mark
because of its sheer strength in the public's mind. Although there will
certainly be exceptions of famous descriptive trademarks, this factor
may supplement other evidence of fame within the general public.
3. Consumer Surveys
Judges are accustomed to dealing with survey evidence, which is
often used to establish likelihood of confusion in trademark cases.389
Therefore, a plaintiff in a dilution case could also offer evidence from
a properly conducted consumer survey to establish that his trademark
is famous to the general public. Some commentators have suggested
that fame should be presumed when forty to fifty percent of the public
associates the plaintiff with his trademark. 390 This Comment advo-
cates that at a bare minimum, fifty percent of the general public
should recognize the plaintiff's trademark to establish fame. Any evi-
dence showing recognition in excess of seventy-five percent of the
sample surveyed should be treated as compelling evidence of fame.
Moreover, the most persuasive evidence of fame would consist of sur-
vey evidence indicating that the rate of recognition for non-purchasers
386. See G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (2d Cir.
1989) (discussing the spectrum of classifications in trademark law).
387. Id. See also Schechter, supra note 43, at 825 ("The more distinctive or unique the mark,
the deeper its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection.").
388. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) and (f) (requiring that a mark which is "merely descriptive" must
"become distinctive" in connection with the applicant's goods or services).
389. See Helene D. Jaffe & Robert G. Sugarman, The Use of Experts and Survey Evidence in
Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, 463 PLI/Pat. 477, 704-720 (1996).
390. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
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of plaintiff's products exceeds seventy-five percent of the general
public.
However, as in any case, survey evidence has certain limitations and
inherent vulnerabilities. In order to minimize these limitations, cer-
tain measures can be taken by the cautious plaintiff. An independent
expert, who is able to objectively conduct the survey, as well as pre-
sent the evidence to a factfinder in subsequent litigation, should be
carefully chosen. 391 Moreover, the survey must use a sample that is
representative of the general population. Therefore, the sample de-
sign, type of sample, and techniques used to select the sample popula-
tion must be meticulously evaluated. 392 Survey evidence that appears
to be based on an unrepresentative sample should be given less weight
in litigation. Therefore, in order to assess recognition by the general
public, it would be important to include consumers who are purchas-
ers and non-purchasers of the plaintiff's product. Finally, a survey's
usefulness is contingent on the fairness of the either the questionnaire
used or questions posed during interviews. 393 Questionnaires must
contain non-leading, unbiased questions regarding the plaintiff's
trademark and products. Furthermore, the manner of interviewing
must comply with objective standards to preserve the integrity of the
statistical results. However, if these measures are taken into consider-
ation, consumer evidence can be an important tool for identifying fa-
mous trademarks.
4. Diversity of Products
The court can also examine the number and diversity of products on
which the trademark appears as evidence of fame within the general
realm of consumers. Fame should be presumed when the trademark is
used on multiple goods that appeal to different purchaser groups.
There is presumably a greater likelihood of fame among the general
public if use of the trademark is not confined to a single product. For
example, NIKE should be given a presumption of fame because the
trademark appears on a multitude of products, including but not lim-
ited to the following: shoes, socks, athletic clothing, outerware, caps,
sunglasses, swimware, sandals, and athletic bags. The sheer number of
products on which the mark appears entitles the plaintiff to a pre-
sumption that the mark is famous to the general public because more
391. See Jaffe & Sugarman, supra note 389, at 641-60.
392. See id. at 592-605 (discussing an "appropriate universe" of people to survey); id. at 605-
616 (noting that everyone should have an equal opportunity to be sampled).
393. Id. at 616-641.
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people have a chance to be exposed to the mark when it is being used
on a variety of popular products.
In its analysis of the degree of fame, courts should examine the pre-
viously discussed factors in addition to any other evidence that is rele-
vant to the particular trademark in question. By focusing on these
factors, a court will be able to accurately identify trademarks that
have achieved fame in the general public and are deserving of the
extraordinary protection provided by the FTDA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should adhere to congressional intent and use the General
Public Theory to identify famous trademarks eligible for Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) protection. The proposed factors
will allow courts to gauge whether a mark has reached "supermark"
status and, consequently, is entitled to federal dilution protection.
Courts should not continue to use the Niche Market Theory because it
allows judges to rely on a likelihood of confusion analysis to conserva-
tively apply the FTDA without engaging in the necessary fame analy-
sis. A strict application of the fame requirement under a General
Public Theory will preserve the distinction between infringement and
dilution, thereby reserving the extraordinary relief under the FTDA
for those supermarks that are truly famous. Moreover, "Fame means
FAME": 394 by limiting FTDA protection to an elite class of
supermarks, courts will preserve the delicate balance between tradi-
tional infringement and dilution theories.
Heidi L. Belongia
394. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 170.
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